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Over the last decade, the Hispanic voting community has emerged as one
of the most important demographic groups in United States politics, especially in
recent presidential elections.  Yet there has been very little research conducted on
Hispanic voter turnout and voting behavior. 
When it comes to theories of minority voting behavior, resource theories
significantly fail to capture the total dynamics of minority group voting behavior
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and turnout.  For example, Hispanics have lower SES resources, such as
education and income, relative to Anglos, but so do African-Americans, yet
African-Americans vote at significantly much higher rates than Hispanics.  One
logical explanation as for why these models fail to explain fully Hispanic turnout
behavior is the fact that almost all the research conducted has been on Anglos.
This researcher proposes a new Hispanic voter model, a theory of
Hispanic surge-and-decline effects on peripheral Hispanic voters, that adds the
concept of self-activation vis-a-vis group consciousness to resource and
mobilization explanations.  This theory is analyzed using recent San Antonio
Mayoral elections, New Mexico Gubernatorial elections and Colorado Senatorial
elections.  Time series analyses and multiple linear regression analyses are
utilized to study precinct-to-the-same-precinct and county-to-the-same-county net
change in turnout between elections.
The results of these analyses strongly support the surge-and-decline
theory.  Specifically, Hispanic surges are tied to increases in peripheral Hispanic
voters, and when viable Hispanic candidates seek office, Hispanic turnout
increases significantly relative to both Anglo turnout and baseline Hispanic
turnout, and when no viable Hispanic runs for office, Hispanic turnout decreases
relatively.
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This has profound future implications.  If the Republican and Democratic
parties want to attract more Hispanic voters for their respective candidates, then
these parties must recruit, run and support viable Hispanic candidates at all levels
of government, including candidates the Vice Presidency and the Presidency. 
Based on the theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline effects, this researcher posits
that the first party to select a viable Hispanic Vice Presidential candidate, and
ultimately a viable Presidential candidate, will be the party that realigns the
majority of Hispanic voters for at least three to four decades.
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Chapter 1
Importance of Hispanic Voters and Hispanic Voter Turnout
The Latino  voting community has recently emerged as a critical political1
force in American presidential elections.  In addition to recently becoming the
largest racial minority group in the United States, the Latino community is the
only major demographic group whose percentage of voter turnout has
significantly increased over the last decade (Census Bureau 1997a, Census
Bureau 2004a).  The Hispanic community has the potential to become the
most important demographic voting group in the United States (Gribbin
1999).  
Except for Cuban-Americans in Florida, Latinos have traditionally
registered and voted Democratic.  Historically, most Republican party
presidential candidates have ignored the broad Latino voting community and
have not directly addressed issues supported by the Latino community in
either the primary or general election phases of presidential campaigns.  The
campaign of Bob Dole in 1996 is an example of this neglectful approach of
many Republican presidential candidates.  With the exception of Cuban-
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Americans during the Florida primary, Dole never reached out to Latino voters
and seldom addressed issues important to the Hispanic community.
An alternative approach used by some Republican presidential
candidates, like Pete Wilson in the 1990s, has been to openly antagonize the
Hispanic community by using Latino and immigration issues as wedge issues
to gain support of white conservatives.  However, recently a new alternative to
the two traditional Republican approaches of neglect and antagonism has
emerged.  In certain areas of the United States, some Republican party
candidates have started to successfully attract a significant number of Latino
voters (Schneider 1998).  George W. Bush made unprecedented attempts to
attract Hispanic voters during his 2000 and 2004 presidential campaigns.  No
Republican presidential candidate has ever spent so much time and money
trying to attract Hispanic voters as did the Bush campaigns in 2000 and 2004.
Partisan Political Dynamics and the Hispanic-Latino Community
During the last decade, the Hispanic voting community has emerged as
potentially the most important demographic group in American politics.  Since
1980, political strategists have focused on a series of demographic groups that
have been identified as potential swing groups.  First it was the Reagan
Democrats, then angry white males, then it became soccer moms and more
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recently married women.  Hispanics could now become the next key swing
group that determines the outcomes of future presidential elections.  
The critical challenge for Republicans to overcome is Hispanic voters
have historically and disproportionately identified themselves with the
Democratic party.  Over the last three decades, certain circles within the
Republican party have been aware of this challenge of disproportionate party
identification.  Beginning in the late 1970s, Republican party activists such as
Lionel Sosa, Governor George W. Bush’s top Hispanic advisor and
advertising consultant during the 2000 and 2004 Bush Presidential
Campaigns, started to raise awareness within the Republican party about the
emerging political importance of the Hispanic community.
Frank Guerra, the Republican National Committee’s (RNC) lead
Hispanic advertising consultant in the 2000 and 2004 campaigns, asserted
Hispanics are a natural constituency group for the Republican party because
“Hispanic values line up with the values of middle America” and the values of
the Republican party (Sylvester 2000).  Sosa, Guerra and others have asserted
the Hispanic community could become a natural ally to Republican
presidential candidates in about 13 states – many of which are rich with
electoral votes.  Furthermore, they contend Hispanics could become a
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significant support group for the GOP if Republicans try to appeal to them. 
This vision is completely contrary to the historical conventional wisdom that
the Hispanic community is, and will always remain, Democratic.
To tap into the emerging Latino voting community successfully,
Republican and nonpartisan strategists generally argue the Republican party
needs to make symbolic, sensitive and substantive appeals to Latinos.  Some
Republicans, like John McCain, Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, have, at
times, successfully attracted significant levels of support from within the
Hispanic community through empathetic pro-Hispanic styles and sensitive
policy positions.  Additionally, these strategists assert Republican candidates
should never offend Latinos by using anti-immigrant and anti-minority wedge
issues.  The use of such wedge issues, perceived as hostile and antagonistic by
most of the Latino community, has led to disastrous effects for the Republican
party.
Demographics of the Hispanic-Latino Community
There are five major demographic trends and factors that explain the
emergence of the Hispanic community as a much sought-after demographic
group in the recent presidential race.  The first demographic factor leading to
the increased political importance of the Latino community is its enormous
5
size.  In the 2000 Census Hispanics represented 12 percent of the total   
United States Population (Census Bureau 2001a).  
The second demographic trend is the astronomical growth of the
Hispanic population.  No major ethnic nor racial group in the United States is
growing as fast as the Hispanic community (Collazo 1999).  In 1900, the
Hispanic population in United States was less than 1 percent (Census Bureau
2002a).  One century later, the Hispanic population totaled 35.3 million
people, representing 12 percent of the total population in United States (Pew
Research Center 2005).  The recent growth rate of the Hispanic population
between the 1990 Census and the 2000 Census was 58 percent (Pew Research
Center 2005).  In fact, in 2000, the Hispanic population surpassed the African-
American community as the largest non-white racial group in the United
States (Census Bureau 2001a).  Additionally, Hispanics have surpassed
African-Americans as the largest racial minority group within many states
such as California and Texas.  In California, the Hispanic electorate doubled
in less than a decade, from 7 percent in 1990 to 14 percent in 1998 (Booth
2000).  The massive migration of foreign-born Hispanics to United States is
one reason for this tremendous and unprecedented increase in the number of
voting-age Hispanics.  In just eight years (1990 to 1998), the number of
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foreign-born Hispanics in the United States grew 34.1 percent, from 8.0
million to 10.7 million (Census Bureau 1990, 1998).  Additionally, the
average Hispanic family is disproportionately large relative to other ethnic and
racial groups in the United States (Census Bureau 2005).  
Interrelated with this trend is the fact that the average age of Hispanics
in the United States is younger than other ethnic and racial groups.  The
median age of Hispanics in 2000 was 26.6, whereas the median ages for non-
Hispanic Whites and non-Hispanic Blacks were 38.6 and 30.6 respectively
(Census Bureau 2001a).  More than 35 percent of all Hispanics are under the
age of 18.  These factors considered together create an ever-increasing
population dynamic, like a rising pyramid, with more and more Hispanics
under the age of 18 becoming voting-age citizens every day.  This means that
unlike other ethnic and racial groups where the number of voting-age citizens
are remaining about the same, or even decreasing, the Latino voting-age
population is disproportionately increasing in numbers.  In California alone,
more than 19,000 Hispanic citizens turn 18 every month (Schneider 1998).
Increased turnout among Hispanic registered voters is the third
demographic trend that has come to the attention of many campaign
strategists.  This trend has been most significant in California.  The effects on
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the overall Republican and Democratic political strategies will be dramatic, if
the trend of higher Latino turnout continues and expands to other states
beyond California.  Historically, Hispanic turnout has been extremely low.  In
the 1996 presidential election, out of the age-eligible United States citizen
population, the turnout was as follows:  whites had a 56.0 percent, African-
Americans 50.6 percent and Hispanics 26.7 percent (Census Bureau 1997a).  
In the 2000 presidential election, 60.4 percent of non-Hispanic whites voted,
54.1 percent of non-Hispanic African-Americans, yet only 27.5 percent of
Latinos reported to the Census Bureau they voted (Census Bureau 2002b).  If
the effect of non-U.S. citizenship is factored out of the 2000 results, 61.8
percent of non-Hispanic whites voted, 55.7 percent of non-Hispanic African-
Americans voted, while 45.1 percent of Hispanic citizens reported they voted
in 2000. Yet, in 1996, the Hispanic community was the only large
demographic group in the country whose turnout actually increased (Schneider
1998).  The surge in Hispanic turnout has been most dramatic in California
where the Hispanic turnout was approximately two-thirds of all Hispanic
registered voters in 1996 (Burns 1998).  There has been a moderate spillover
effect to other states, especially those in the western part of the United States. 
Most political observers attribute this dramatic increase to the “threats” of
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issues such as Propositions 187, 209 and 227 and the use of negative
campaign wedge issues by candidates such as former Republican presidential
contenders Pete Wilson and Pat Buchanan (Smith 1998; Purdum 1997).
The fourth major demographic trend observed by political strategists is 
the concentration of Hispanic population in a small number of states that are
rich with electoral votes.  California leads the country with 11.0 million
Hispanics, followed by Texas with 6.7 million, New York with 2.9 million,
Florida with 2.7 million and Illinois with 1.5 million (Census Bureau 2002b). 
These five states account for 168 Electoral College Votes.  Overall, the
Hispanic population in the United States is mostly concentrated in 11 states
that hold a total of 217 Electoral College Votes.  Of these 11 highly Hispanic
concentrated states, it is important to note four remained “battleground” states
throughout the 2004 presidential campaign and contain a total of 47 Electoral
College Votes.  These four states, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada and Florida
have 42, 25, 20 and 17 percent Hispanic of state populations respectively. 
Additionally, these Latino concentrated states have experienced dramatic
increases in the number of Latinos in a brief period of time (between 1990 and
1997), an increase of 2.2 million Hispanics in California, 1.4 million in Texas
and .5 million in Florida (Census Bureau 1997b).  Other states such as      
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New Jersey, Arizona, New Mexico and Nevada have markedly high Hispanic
growth rates.  The high concentration of Hispanics in electoral-rich states,
many of which are politically competitive, will have profound effects on
presidential campaigns for at least the next three decades.
The fifth and final factor leading to the emerging importance of the
Hispanic community is most of the Republican party has now realized
continuing to ignore and alienate Latino voters is unproductive when
considering the new political calculus.  Many Republican candidates and
political strategists, over the last three decades, have started to actively
compete for Hispanic voters – voters that Republican candidates often
overlooked in the past.  Many, such as Sosa, major Republican fundraiser 
Sam Barshop and longtime Republican strategist Stuart Spencer, have
encouraged the GOP to actively target and pursue the Latino vote.  They have
argued Latinos should feel at home in a Republican party that stands for self-
reliance, hard work, support of small business, family values and anti-abortion
issues (Purdum 1997; Willis 1998).  
The Hispanic Community Is Not Monolithic
It is very important for political scientists and strategists to understand
the Hispanic community is not monolithic and homogeneous.  Most scholars
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assert at least 25 major Hispanic sub-groups live in America.  Political
scientists have often categorized Hispanics into five broad groups: Mexican-
Americans, Cuban-Americans, Puerto Rican-Americans, Central-Americans
and South-Americans.  
Mexican-Americans make up approximately two-thirds of the total
Hispanic population in the United States, and within this group of Mexican-
Americans there are three sub-groups.  The first sub-group comprises
immigrants who have recently arrived in the United States from Mexico. 
These immigrants may or may not be legal residents or citizens of the    
United States.  Many within this group are concentrated in communities close
to the Mexico-United States border, in communities like East Los Angeles and 
     El Paso.  On a socio-political level, this group generally focuses on the
basic survival needs of life such as shelter, food, clothing and employment,
and is thus much less politically active than others within the Mexican-
American community.  The second sub-group of Mexican-Americans consists
of citizens who have been in the United States for two to three generations. 
This group is much more politically active and involved than the recent arrival
group.  The third sub-group consists of Mexican-American citizens whose
family ties to their local community go back several generations.  Many within
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this group have family roots and local community connections that date from
the days of governance by Spain and Mexico.  These families did not move to
the United States, instead the Mexico-United States border moved south, thus
changing the national governmental dominion over their communities.  This
group tends to be active in political affairs.
The Cuban-American and Puerto Rican-American populations are
about the same size in terms of numbers, but are different in terms of political
tendencies and regional makeup.  Cuban-Americans, located mostly in the
greater Miami area, are fiercely anti-Castro, anti-communist and have been
strongly pro-Republican since the Bay of Pigs fiasco during the Kennedy
Administration.  Puerto Rican-Americans, on the other hand, have been loyal
to the Democratic Party and are generally concentrated in areas around     
New York and New Jersey.  In general terms, Central-American and South-
American Latinos are currently numerically inconsequential at the national
presidential campaign level, with a notable exception of the Nicaraguan
community in the Orlando area.
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Chapter 2
Historical Hispanic Partisan Alignments and
Partisan Hispanic Outreach Styles
The Democratic party has historically been the home of most Hispanic voter
groups, with the exception of Cuban-Americans (de la Garza and DeSipio
1999; Gribbin 1999).  Concurrently, Democratic presidential candidates have
consistently supported favorable policy positions on issues important to most
Hispanic voters.  Overall, Democrats have been much more supportive than
Republican candidates and have thus been traditionally more successful in
attracting Latino voters.  Unlike the Democratic party that has generally
courted Latino voters for more than 45 years, many Republican presidential
candidates have either ignored or antagonized the Latino voting community. 
The use of negative anti-immigrant wedge issues by several Republican
presidential candidates has created many impediments to the potential
attraction of Latino voters by Republican candidates.  Beyond policy
positioning, the outreach styles of Republican presidential candidates have
varied widely, but have been generally antagonistic or neglectful in nature and
tone toward the Hispanic community.
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Most Republican presidential candidates and strategists have fallen
into one of three “style groups” relating to their views on how to interact with
the Hispanic community.  The first group includes Republican presidential
campaigns that have traditionally ignored and neglected the Latino
community.  The Presidential Campaign of Bob Dole in 1996, which did not
make much of an effort to attract Hispanic voters, is an example of a
campaign in this style group.  Candidates in this group seldom appeal to
Hispanic voters and usually hail from places where Hispanic voters are not a
significant factor in local politics.  The second group of Republicans is
composed of politicians, like 1996 Presidential candidate Pete Wilson of
California, who have been willing to negatively use anti-Hispanic policies as
“wedge” issues in their campaigns in order to attract conservative white
voters.  The final group of Republicans is made up of candidates, like 2000
and 2004 Presidential Candidate George W. Bush, who believe the future
viability of the Republican party is integrally tied to successfully attracting a
significant number of Hispanic voters.  In his 2000 campaign, Bush
aggressively tried to attract Hispanic voters often describing himself as a
“different kind of Republican” (Sosa 2003).
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Republican strategists and candidates have been engaged in an on-
going struggle about how to approach the Hispanic community for more than
20 years (Purdum 1997).  If the George W. Bush-led group wins out, the
Republican party could end up realigning a majority of Hispanic voters into
the Republican party; however, if the Wilson faction prevails, Republicans
will probably never be able to attract large percentages of Hispanic voters for
at least several decades.  Because the Hispanic voting bloc is truly a sleeping
giant, the potential magnitude of this realignment, if successful, cannot be
over stated.  Many Republicans note the Hispanic community is growing
faster than any other segment of the American voting public.  Latinos are
registering at higher rates and are turning out to vote more than ever before in
the history of the Hispanic experience in the United States.  From the
Republican perspective, if Hispanics were to consistently vote 40 to 50
percent for Republican candidates, this would prove to be an outstanding
political breakthrough and achievement.
If the Wilson group of antagonists or the Dole group of neglectors
prevail, the Republicans will turn away the Hispanic community which will
lead to Latinos becoming a larger-than-ever voting force within the
Democratic party.  The results of recent elections in California show when
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Hispanic issues are used as negative wedge issues, Hispanics turnout in
unprecedented numbers and vote predominantly Democratic.  The Hispanic
community will be mobilized and motivated to register and vote at higher
percentages, actively voting against the GOP if the Wilson antagonists group
gains control of the Republican message.  Therefore, if the Republicans want
to realign a significant majority of Hispanics into the Republican party with
lasting impact, the Bush group must prevail in controlling the messages and
policy positions that affect the Hispanic community.  Doing so would help to
prevent the development of a guilt-by-association phenomenon with the
Wilson antagonists.  Promoting a sensitive message is especially important
since the Republican party has a history of insensitivity to minorities in
general.
The Start of Hispanic Outreach: IKE? – 1952 and 1956
Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his 1952 presidential campaign, made the
first effort by a presidential candidate of either major party to target Hispanic
voters (Sosa 2003).  What at first might appear counterintuitive – a
Republican presidential candidate in the 1950s reaching out to the Hispanic
community – makes more sense when analyzed within the personal context of
Eisenhower’s life experiences.  Eisenhower had deep personal roots in South
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Texas.  Eisenhower and his family had spent several years living in            
San Antonio while he was stationed at Fort Sam Houston during two different
tours of duty (Davis 1969).  Additionally, Eisenhower spent a significant
amount of his off-duty time at St. Mary’s University helping to coach athletic
teams.  St. Mary’s University of San Antonio has traditionally been a
predominantly Hispanic college and has a reputation of activism within the
Hispanic community.  Eisenhower’s personal convictions, which were
grounded in his close contact with the Latino community in San Antonio, may
better explain the outreach to Hispanic voters by Eisenhower rather than a
global political strategy.
JFK’s Counter Riposte – 1960
In 1960, the John F. Kennedy campaign was the first Democratic
presidential campaign to systematically target Hispanic voters.  Kennedy and
his aides believed Kennedy’s Catholicism was a natural bridge to the
predominantly Catholic Hispanic community.  Many scholars consider the
Kennedy Latino outreach campaign to be the most extensive and
comprehensive Latino outreach effort ever conducted by a presidential
campaign  (DeSipio, de la Garza and Setzler 1999; Gross 2000). 
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Until the efforts of the Eisenhower Republican campaigns, Hispanics
traditionally voted around 90 percent for Democratic presidential candidates. 
In a clear effort to retain the Hispanic voting bloc as part of the core
Democratic voting coalition, the Kennedy campaign ran both an air war
(television advertising) and a ground war (grassroots mobilization) targeting
both habitual and non-habitual Latino voters.  The Kenney air campaign ran a
television advertisement featuring Jackie Kennedy saying in Spanish, “my
husband always pays attention to the interests of all sectors of American
society” (Gross 2000).  This is the first known television advertisement to
feature a presidential candidate’s wife and the first known television
advertisement produced in Spanish.  
The prime component of the Kennedy campaign ground war was an
extensive network of Viva Kennedy! clubs in Latino communities throughout
the United States.  The 1960 Kennedy campaign conducted what is generally
considered the most elaborate and extensive grassroots mobilization effort
ever for a presidential campaign.  The hallmark of the 1960 Viva Kennedy
campaign was it targeted both habitual and non-habitual voters and it went
beyond macro-media advertising with the creation of an across-the-board,
mass grassroots campaign structure to mobilize and get out the Latino vote.
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Return of Neglect by Both Parties – 1964 to 1972
From 1964 through 1972, there were relatively minimal levels of
formalized Hispanic outreach activities by both Democratic and Republican
presidential campaigns.  During these election cycles, the Democratic
presidential candidates received approximately 80 percent or more of the
Hispanic votes.  The presidential campaigns from 1964 to 1972 were in many
ways similar to the pre-1952 presidential campaigns because most Hispanics
voted for the Democratic presidential candidate and there was little or no
dedicated outreach efforts to mobilize Hispanic voters by either of the parties. 
One can explain the reason for the lack of extensive Latino outreach programs
during this time frame in part because the battleground states during these
elections generally had relatively fewer Hispanic voters.  
The enlightened sensitivity shown by Eisenhower and Kennedy toward
the Hispanic community was spawned primarily by their personal life
experiences and viewpoints rather than by a grand political strategy and was at
a time when presidential campaigns were becoming ever more candidate
centered, and less party driven and controlled.  None of the presidential
candidates from 1964 through 1972 had extensive interpersonal interaction
with the Hispanic community, with the exception of Lyndon B. Johnson.  As
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for Johnson in 1964, the campaign was so one-sided in Johnson’s favor that he
did not need to tactically mobilize the Hispanic community.
Ford’s False Start – 1976
In 1976, during the presidential Republican primary campaign against
Ronald Reagan, Gerald Ford made a concerted effort to attract Hispanic voters
in the critical swing state of Texas.  While at a campaign rally in front of the
Alamo, President Ford was handed a tamale to eat as part of a photo-op, at
which time Ford proceeded “with gusto” to bite through the corn husk rather
than taking it off first (Popkin 1994, 1).  Ford’s incorrect consumption of this
Mexican culinary delight was so embarrassing his gaffe was printed on the
front page of the New York Times.  Samuel Popkin asserts Ford’s misfortune
in front of the Alamo, rightly or wrongly, proved to be a negative cue about
Ford’s level of sensitivity toward the Hispanic community.  
This incident became symbolic of Ford’s lack of understanding of the
Latino community throughout the United States.  In response to a reporter’s
question, at Ford’s first White House press conference after his loss to  
Jimmy Carter, to name the single most important lesson he had learned from
the campaign, Ford responded learning how to shuck a tamale (Popkin 1994).
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If presidential candidates want to be successful in attracting Latino
voters, it is critical for candidates to show sensitivity and compassion toward
the Latino community.  Latino voters feel more comfortable with a candidate
who seems to “understand” their community by demonstrating a knowledge of
foods, music, language, customs and cultural traditions.  The contrary also
holds true.  As with Ford in 1976, if a presidential candidate shows a lack of
understanding of the Latino community, it is unlikely the Latino voting
community will vote for that particular candidate.  Juxtaposed to Ford,
presidential candidate Jimmy Carter was successful in his outreach activities
to the Hispanic community.  Carter actively pursued Hispanic voters and is
generally considered the first presidential candidate ever personally to speak
Spanish on the campaign trail.  With the help of a strong showing in the
predominantly Hispanic voting precincts in south Texas, Carter narrowly beat
Ford in Texas, thus contributing significantly to Carter’s close Electoral
College victory in 1976.
Reagan the Republican Trailblazer – 1980
Reagan was more successful than any other Republic presidential
candidate ever before in attracting Hispanic voters and was especially
successful in attracting Cuban Latinos.  In 1980, Reagan received
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approximately 37 percent of the Hispanic vote (DeSipio, de la Garza and
Setzler 1999).  
Reagan’s anti-Castro and anti-communism rhetoric resonated with
Cuban-Americans in the Miami-Dade County area.  In many ways, Reagan’s
successful strategic efforts to target Cuban-Americans in the Little Havana
community during his 1980 campaign significantly solidified the realignment
of Cuban-Americans to the Republican party.  Before the Bay of Pigs disaster
during the Kennedy administration, Cuban-Americans voted mostly for
Democratic presidential candidates (Moreno and Warren 1999).
For the first time ever, a Republican presidential candidate fully
utilized a Latino advertising agency to produce and place Hispanic targeted
advertisements.  Reagan hired Lionel Sosa of San Antonio to coordinate
Latino media advertising and marketing.  Sosa created several television
advertisements targeting Hispanics in the southwestern United States
emphasizing the policy themes of pro-family, anti-communism, pro-military
and individual responsibility.  Reagan strongly believed the core Republican
issues, such as pro-family, anti-abortion, anti-communism and individual
responsibility, would attract a large number of Hispanic voters.  Reagan once
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even told Sosa Hispanics “are Republicans, they just don’t know it” (Sosa
2003).  
Reagan the Backslider – 1984
During his reelection campaign in 1984, Reagan was far less
successful in attracting Latino voters than he was in 1980.  Reagan attracted
conservative Hispanic voters in 1984, but was not successful in attracting
moderate Hispanic voters.  The degradation of Hispanic support for Reagan
can be mostly explained by the policy positions and political actions taken by
Reagan during his first term.  Had Reagan appointed more Latinos to senior
levels of his administration and had he been more sensitive to policy concerns
of the Hispanic community, he might have been able to increase the level of
Hispanic support in 1984.  Reagan initially was a good campaigner within the
Latino community; however, many of his core policy positions were either
irrelevant or antagonistic to the Latino voting community. 
Neglect by Both Parties: Take Two – 1988
The outreach efforts of the 1988 presidential campaign were just as
modest in scope as the 1964 through 1972 campaigns and, as a result, most
Hispanics voted for the Democratic president candidate.  The Democratic
National Committee (DNC) participated in several voter registration drives
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during the spring and summer months, but these registration drives were not
followed-up with comprehensive mobilization and get-out-the-vote efforts. 
Because of dwindling resources, the DNC choose to put more resources into
other targeted voting groups rather than into the Latino community.  Many
within the national Democratic leadership took the Hispanic voting bloc for
granted assuming presidential candidate Michael Dukakis would receive 70
percent or more of the Latino votes.  
The unexpected death early in the 1988 campaign of Willie Velasquez,
who was the most vocal champion of a comprehensive and well-funded
Democratic Latino outreach program, further weakened the Democratic Latino
outreach efforts during the campaign.  No one was successful in pursuing
Velasquez’s vision of a comprehensive outreach program during the 1988
general campaign.  Concurrently, many Republican strategists believed the
Hispanic community was not in “play” during this campaign cycle, and did not
see it as a worthwhile investment to expend limited Republican resources
trying to move this community.  Ironically, it was during this campaign cycle
that many down-ballot Republican candidates at the state and local level
started to solicit and successfully receive increased Hispanic voter support
(Sosa 2003).
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Clinton’s Vision, a Return to 1960 Levels of Outreach – 1992
For tactical, strategic and philosophical reasons, the 1992 Bill Clinton
presidential campaign conducted a well-planned and integrated effort to reach
out to the Latino community.  The Clinton campaign in 1992 was the first
presidential campaign since the 1960 John F. Kennedy presidential campaign
to dedicate significant levels of resources to both advertising and grassroots
mobilization.  As part of his outreach to minority groups, Clinton repeatedly
stated throughout his 1992 campaign if elected his administration would “look
more like America” (Subervi-Vélez and Cunningham 1999).  
Several presidential campaigns between Kennedy’s 1960 campaign
and Clinton’s 1992 campaign employed the use of television and radio
advertising to actively target Hispanic voters.  However, none of the
campaigns between 1960 and 1992 fully and effectively utilized ground forces
to mobilize traditionally low voting segments of the Hispanic community.  By
combining an air strategy with ground mobilization, Clinton was effective in
turning-out Latino voters, even seeing some marginal improvement toward the
Democrats with Cuban-American voters in Florida.  
The Electoral College strategy of the Clinton campaign included
tactical initiatives in many states with significant levels of Latino voters such
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as Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Nevada and New Mexico (Shaw 1999). 
Clinton had both philosophical and tactical reasons to actively reach out to the
Hispanic community.  Additionally, Clinton strategists were keenly aware of
the recent successes many Republican candidates were having in attracting
Hispanic voters at the state and local levels and were concerned about what
could happen to the Latino vote if the Democrats took the Latino community
for granted (Cisneros 2000).
Clinton II, the Most Comprehensive Hispanic Outreach Yet – 1996
Clinton’s 1996 Latino outreach campaign has been considered the best
and most effective Hispanic outreach campaign of any presidential campaign
(Cisneros 2000).  Andy Hernandez is credited for creating the Clinton
presidential Latino outreach campaign strategy (Subervi-Vélez and
Cunningham 1999; Cisneros 2000).  Working out of the Democratic National
Committee (DNC) and reporting directly to Donald Fowler, the DNC chair,
Hernandez orchestrated the creation of the Office of Latino Outreach (OLO). 
OLO developed and implemented a top-to-bottom Latino outreach campaign
which utilized the resources of the DNC, the Clinton-Gore presidential
campaign and the Latino presidential political appointees throughout the
administration.  
26
The OLO initiatives included polling and research, traditional outreach
efforts, opposition research, development and distribution of targeted
messages relevant to the Hispanic community.  Additionally, it coordinated a
surrogate program of Latino leaders both inside and outside of the
administration, orchestrated earned media events, oversaw the production and
placement of television advertising via two different Latino advertising firms
and proactively contacted Latino media outlets.  In most instances, the
initiatives and activities of OLO targeted specific Latino sub-groups or
specific geographic markets throughout the United States.  
There are three main reasons why the 1996 Democratic presidential
Latino outreach campaign was so successful (de la Garza and DeSipio 1999). 
First, candidate Bill Clinton  was very supportive of specialized ethnic sub-
campaigns.  Second, the Director of OLO, Andy Hernandez, was strategically
and tactically brilliant in the development and implementation of the overall
Latino outreach effort.  Finally, OLO had many champions throughout the
Clinton administration and the Clinton-Gore campaign, most notably Cabinet
Secretaries Federico Peña and Henry Cisneros who garnered adequate levels
of funding and respect for OLO through the duration of the campaign, and
throughout the campaign structure.
27
Pete Wilson’s Antagonist Assault on the Hispanic Community – 1996
Candidates like Pete Wilson and Pat Buchanan have attempted to use
Latino and Mexican immigrant issues as wedge issues to gain support of white
conservative voters, especially during the presidential primary season of their
respective campaigns.  Because of the controversial nature of these policy
positions, the media has generally given pronouncements on these issues
increased media coverage.  As a result, these types of candidates have openly
antagonized the Hispanic community.  
From a Republican perspective this approach forfeits Hispanic voters
to the Democrats and activates Hispanic voters to turnout at higher than
average rates for Democratic presidential candidates.  As part of Wilson’s
strategic political positioning both in California and for his 1996 presidential
candidacy, he staked out four antagonistic policy positions: the discontinuance
of public and social services to illegal aliens (California Proposition 187); the
discontinuance of race/ethnicity and gender affirmative action in public
education and state contracting of services (California Proposition 209); the
discontinuance of bilingual education (California Proposition 227); and the
pursuit of hostile positions toward the Mexican Government involving
common border issues.
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In 1994, proponents of banning undocumented immigrants from
receiving public services, such as education, social and medical services,
formally introduced Proposition 187 as the Save Our State (SOS) initiative. 
Pete Wilson argued banning of undocumented immigrants from receiving
public services was critical to protect California’s treasury and way of life. 
The opponents, on the other hand, thought Proposition 187 was a wedge issue
that played to the fears of a cultural, economic and ethnic invasion from
Mexican immigrants crossing the California border.  Proposition 187 stated:
[Californians] have suffered and are suffering economic hardship
caused by the presence of illegal aliens . . . [Californians thus] have a
right to the protection of their government from any person or persons
entering this country unlawfully [and to] prevent illegal 
aliens from receiving benefits or public services in the State of
California (State of California 1994).
On November 9, 1994, Proposition 187 passed with 59 percent in favor and 41
percent in opposition.  
Prior to 1994, Wilson, as the Mayor of San Diego and as a         
United States Senator, was perceived by many political observers as an
ideological moderate, middle-of-the-road Republican, who in some circles
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was even considered a liberal Republican.  Because of the weakened
California economy, due in large part to defense industry cutbacks and a
general national recession, Governor Wilson’s approval rating was at an all-
time low in 1993  (Tolbert and Hero 1996; McDonnell 1997; Johnson 1996). 
Early in the election process, Kathleen Brown, the Democratic gubernatorial
candidate, led Wilson in the polls by as much as 23 percentage points (Tolbert
and Hero 1996).  Wilson was in significant political trouble and stood a strong
chance of being upset by Brown.  
It was at this time Wilson decided to capitalize on the growing
dissatisfaction with the flood of illegal aliens crossing the border of Mexico
into California.  After polling, Wilson calculated he could hook his political
wagon onto the anti-immigration ground swell and ride the coattails of
Proposition 187 to victory.  Wilson then made immigration, specifically
Proposition 187, his number one issue in the campaign – so much so that
during the debates with Brown, immigration and Proposition 187 was the
most discussed issue (Jamieson 1998).  Wilson often spoke of the need to
“send Washington a message” regarding immigration policies.  Wilson went
as far as to run reelection television commercials showing footage of illegal
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aliens streaming across the border with a voice-over saying “they keep coming
. . .” (Purdum 1997).  Wilson correctly calculated the interlocking of his
campaign with Proposition 187 would lead to his come-from-behind victory. 
On election day in 1994, Wilson received 55 percent of the vote, beating
Brown by 15 percentage points, an amazing 38 percentage point reversal from
his lowest point in the polls.
As with Proposition 187, Wilson actively campaigned for Proposition
209, a California initiative designed to end affirmative action especially
relating to the selection and admission of students to colleges and universities
and for the awarding of government contracts.  This initiative was formally
titled California Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI) and was orchestrated by
Governor Wilson.  Wilson acted as the Honorary Chair of the Campaign, and
with Ward Connerly, led and organized the campaign.  After an extremely
hostile campaign, Proposition 209 passed by the California voters on
November 5, 1996, with 54 percent in favor and 46 percent in opposition. 
After the passage of Proposition 209, Wilson aggressively led the defense of
Proposition 209 in the many legal challenges in the State and Federal Courts.
Many opponents of Wilson charged he was using Propositions 187 and
209 as wedge issues: Proposition 187 to revive his reelection as Governor in
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1994 and Proposition 209 to set up his Presidential run in 1996.  Some
strategists theorized Wilson was perceived to be too moderate to win
conservative Republican presidential primaries and caucuses because he was
pro-choice on abortions and his aggressive positions on environmental issues. 
Therefore, Wilson supported a few right-wing issues in order to build his
conservative credentials.  As for the State of California, the combination of
Proposition 187 and 209 led to extremely pronounced fissures between many
groups within the state.  Some theorists such as Marelius (1998) assert the
sharp break between Wilson and the Hispanic community was the result of the
abrasive rhetoric and advertising used by Wilson as much as his policy
positions.
The final perceived anti-Hispanic initiative in a sequence of polarizing
California propositions was Proposition 227, formally titled English Language
in Public Schools.  The purpose of Proposition 227 was to dismantle bilingual
education programs in California schools and replace these programs with
one-year English emersion programs.  Formally this initiative amended the
California Education Code in such a way as to change how “limited English
proficient” (LEP) students were to be educated.  As with Propositions 187 and
209, Wilson actively supported Proposition 227.  Wilson described bilingual
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education as “one of the great misfired good intentions of our time” (Smith
1998).
As with many controversial issues, Proposition 227 had many sub rosa
facets that persisted underneath the surface of the general public debate. 
Crawford (1997), Marelius (1998) and Purdum (1997) contend there was a
reservoir of distrust, anger, and in some circles hate against Hispanics and
other immigrant groups, that permeated the white voting population in
California.  So many voters feared a flood of immigration from Mexico that
polling research picked up significant levels of trepidation about being
overwhelmed and overtaken by Mexican nationals and Hispanics.  Many
feared the decline of communities, an increase of crime in neighborhoods and
a switch to Spanish as the primary language.  The recent increases in the use
of Spanish in the everyday workings of local society and commerce especially
frustrated many white voters.  On June 2, 1988, Proposition 227 was approved
by the California voters with 61 percent in favor and 39 percent in opposition. 
By the time the Proposition 227 election occurred in 1998, California
voters and citizens had been exposed to three consecutive election cycles filled
with direct and indirect messages that were extremely negative toward the
Latino and Mexican national communities.  For more than seven years, there
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was a continuous and sustained sequence of anti-Hispanic messages in the
public arena.  Additionally, Wilson’s anti-Hispanic persona was reinforced
and amplified by his insensitive dealings with Mexican elected officials
regarding border policy issues.  Unlike the other three United States state
governors along the Mexican border, Wilson had a strained and, at times
nonexistent, relationships with his Mexican counterparts.  His relationships
with Mexican officials often were surprisingly undiplomatic and hostile. 
Wilson regularly and harshly complained about Mexico’s handling of border
issues such as immigration, drug smuggling and pollution.  Additionally, he
actively and aggressively opposed the certification of Mexico as a cooperative
partner in the drug war.  Unlike the other American border governors, Wilson
never even met with then Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo.
Wilson never again attempted a serious outreach effort to the Hispanic
community after his initial insensitive messages.  His anti-Hispanic image was
forever impressed in the minds of most Hispanic voters when he used his
"They Keep Coming” television advertisement during the 1994 gubernatorial
reelection campaign.  This advertisement, for many voters in California, was
reminiscent of the 1988 Willie Horton presidential advertisement.  The result
was a devastating set of losses in the 1998 California election.  The
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Democratic candidate for governor, Gray Davis, beat Republican Dan Lungren
by a 20 percentage point landslide.  Republicans lost many of the open seat
elections throughout the state that year as well.  Wilson single-handedly
reversed the previous trend of increasing Hispanic voting support for
Republican candidates in California by decreasing the appeal of the
Republican party and motivating the Hispanic voter turnout in favor of
Democrats throughout California (Cannon and Booth 1999).  This anti-
Hispanic image of Wilson, the top Republican in the most populated state in
the United States, bled over from the California Republican party to the
national Republican party, thus hurting many GOP candidates around the
country with Latino voters.  This phenomenon is analogous to              
Richard Shingles' theory in terms of African-American consciousness and
political participation in his research on African-American political
participation and voter turnout (Shingles 1981).
When Wilson first ran for governor in 1990, before advocating support
of Propositions 187, 209 and 227, he received 44 percent of the Hispanic vote. 
In 1994, on the same ballot with Proposition 187, he only received 25 percent
of the Hispanic vote.  Then in 1998, Republican gubernatorial candidate    
Dan Lungren received about 20 percent of the Hispanic vote (Sullivan 1998). 
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Long-time Republican strategist Stuart Spencer said this “trend [the loss of
Hispanic support] is obvious and the political danger is real . . . [the
Republican party risks] political suicide and dooms itself to permanent
minority status in California” if this trend is not reversed.  Spencer went on to
say “[w]e are dramatically losing market share of the fastest growing segment
of the electorate” (Purdum 1997).    
The irony of Wilson’s anti-Hispanic positioning is many political
observers in the early 1990s perceived Wilson as the first national
“compassionate conservative” (Marelius 1998).  Wilson is arguably one of the
most successful politicians California has ever had of either party, with the
possible exceptions of Ronald Reagan and Richard Nixon. Yet when Wilson
was in political trouble in 1994, he lurched to the right and admittedly used
Proposition 187 as a wedge issue to turn his impending loss into an upset win. 
Then, when he became an active candidate for the Republican nomination for
President in 1995, Wilson turned to what had worked for him in 1994 – the
use of racial and ethnic wedge issues.  Beyond Proposition 187 rhetoric, he
added anti-affirmative action messages to his core messages in his 1996
presidential campaign.  At best, Wilson’s message was perceived as
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insensitive and callous; at worst, his harsh driving rhetoric was extremely
mean spirited.
The use of Proposition 187 as a wedge issue proved to be a short-term
success for Wilson’s 1994 reelection effort but the long-term damage to the
Republican party has been dramatic and disastrous.  By 1998, California had
functionally become a one-party state in state-wide races.  Many Republican
strategists are asking whether the damage caused by the anti-Latino messages
can be reversed in the near future or whether it will take an extended period of
time to repair the damaging effects of Wilson.  The Democratic control of the
post-2000 redistricting process in California exacerbated the damage done to
the Republican party nationwide by Wilson.  Lance Tarrance, a GOP pollster
and a key Republican strategist in 2000, described Wilson’s behavior and
actions as “a case history of what not to do” (Marinucci 2000).  Wilson
remains politically unrepentant saying in a feature newspaper interview:
People who refer to wedge issues are generally liberals who want to
duck the issue.  Wedge issues are real issues.  They are problems
calling out for attention. (Marelius 1998).
37
Bob Dole and the Return of Traditional Republican Neglect – 1996
The 1996 Bob Dole presidential campaign is an example of the
traditional neglect by many Republican presidential candidates of the Latino
community.  Except for a limited tactical outreach program by the Dole
campaign to Hispanic elites in the states of Texas, New York, California and
Florida during the primary season, none of the 1996 Republican presidential
contenders seriously attempted to reach out to Latino voters.  Believing Latino
voters were part of the traditional Democratic bloc, Lamar Alexander,     
Steve Forbes, Alan Keyes and others did not feel that allocation of the scarce
resources of time and money to Latino outreach programs was a worthwhile
endeavor.
Dole's victorious turning point in the 1996 Republican nominating
campaign came on Super Tuesday when Dole emerged as the undisputed
leader in the race for the Republican nomination as a result of the strong
Cuban-American support in Florida.  In Florida, Dole actively worked to
attract Cuban-American voters, specifically in the Miami-Dade County area. 
Mostly due to Dole’s very forceful anti-communist, anti-Castro rhetoric, Dole 
advantageously lined up endorsements from the most influential Cuban-
American political elites in Florida.  Dole received more than 80 percent of
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Cuban-Americans in Dade County which helped Dole to receive 57 percent of
the overall statewide vote (Moreno and Warren 1999).
After receiving the Republican nomination, Dole's outreach program to
Latino voters during the 1996 general election phase was minimal as he
seldom addressed important issues of the Latino community.  As it turned out,
he did not want to antagonize the conservative right, especially in the key
battleground state of California.  Many within the campaign thought Dole
could not win the presidency unless he won California.  Because of this must-
win California strategy, Dole became a politically expedient supporter of
California Proposition 187 like Pete Wilson.  It should be noted in the early
stages of the general election campaign, Dole tried to balance the need to win
California with the desire to appeal to Latinos.  Overtime, his political
schizophrenia became too difficult to reconcile and the need to win California
prevailed.  Although he succeeded in attracting Cuban-Americans during the
Florida primary and Latino voters in other primary states, his campaign made
a fatally strategic decision to distance Dole from potential Hispanic voters
during the 1996 general election.  This resulted in a conspicuous public
avoidance of Latino and Cuban-American voters by Dole during most of the
general election campaign.  
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Although Dole had the same policy position as Pete Wilson and      
Pat Buchanan on Preposition 187, his tone was more civil than Wilson and
Buchanan who openly and harshly used Proposition 187 as an antagonist
wedge issue.  Dole preferred whenever possible to avoid issues like
Proposition 187, whereas Wilson and Buchanan relished the aggressive use of
these types of issues in the political rhetoric of the campaign.  However, he
did poorly with Hispanics in the general election campaign because he
essentially ignored the Hispanic Community.  His poor performance with
Latino votes also carried over to Cuban-American voters.  Because of Dole’s
avoidance of the Cuban-American community and Bill Clinton’s aggressive
outreach to Cuban-Americans, Clinton received more Cuban-American votes
than any other Democratic presidential candidate in the post Bay of Pigs Era,
with Clinton almost winning a plurality of the Cuban-American votes. 
Change in GOP Outreach, Bush’s Gubernatorial Races – 1994 and 1998
George W. Bush did not face citizen-initiated propositions like 187,
209 and 227 while governor of Texas, yet he did make his concerns and
uneasiness about these issues publicly known.  Bush openly spoke out against
these propositions, calling them “divisive” (Smith 1998).  Unlike Wilson, he
refused to cut back certain social services benefitting illegal immigrants
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(Mayes 1999).  Bush also said “I was against the spirit of Prop 187 for my
state . . . I felt like every child ought to be educated regardless of the status of
their parents” (Schneider 1999).  Regarding bilingual education, Bush actively
promoted and embraced bilingualism.  He often talked about the advantages of
learning both English and Spanish, and regularly conducted interviews in
Spanish. 
Beyond these issues, Bush diligently worked to develop relationships
with Mexican governmental officials.  Bush met with President Zedillo four
times in his first four years as governor of Texas and vigorously supported
NAFTA as well as the certification of Mexico’s anti-drug efforts, whereas,
Wilson never met with Zedillo and was very critical of Mexico’s anti-drug
endeavors.  During his governorship, Bush met regularly with his elected
counterparts from Mexico and even celebrated Cinco de Mayo with Mexican
border governors and officials.
Bush worked vigorously to create a pro-Hispanic style and actively
pursued Hispanic voters.  At campaign events, Bush would often have
Hispanic elected officials introduce him, sometimes even Democrats.  He
spoke some Spanish during almost every campaign speech he gave, and
always strategically used Spanish-language advertising to reach out to the
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Hispanic community.  Lionel Sosa, a long-time Bush strategist for Hispanic
campaign advertising, actively promoted a pro-Hispanic culture within the
inner-circles of Bush campaigns.  Some observers like Domencio Maceri
(1999) have asserted showing interest in the Hispanic community, openly
speaking Spanish, and being generally sensitive to the issues of the Hispanic
community is critical in order to gain an “emotional entree to voters minds.” 
Substance is what matters over the long term, but style is what opens the
communication channels.  For a Republican, Bush received record levels of
support from the Hispanic community in the 1998 gubernatorial election due
to his outreach efforts to the Hispanic community. 
Bush’s Unique Hispanic Outreach Goes National – 2000
For the most part, Democratic strategists have done very little to
actuate the recent change in Latino voting behavior.  Instead, it has been the
actions of antagonistic Republicans like Wilson and Buchanan that have
pushed conservative and independent Hispanic voters back into the
Democratic party.  Spencer, the Republican strategist, warned:
Our [the Republican] party has a sad history of alienating immigrant
groups and new voters . . . [t]he GOP closed the door to Irish and
Italian immigrants in Massachusetts and New York in the last century. 
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We [Republicans] did the same to Poles and other Eastern Europeans
in Chicago and other urban centers.  We did it again to Asian-
Americans in Hawaii (Purdum 1997).
Sosa, Guerra, Spencer and Tarrance posit the long term viability of the
Republican party is directly tied to the successful attraction of a substantial
number of Hispanics.  These strategists note until 1994, Republicans were
successfully attracting Hispanic voters away from the Democrats.  These
Republican strategists assert, pre-1994, the Democrats’ assumption of Latino
support may well have provided the opportunity needed for Republicans to
attract significant and meaningful levels of Latino voters around the nation. 
Additionally, Spencer and Tarrance have asserted it is imperative for
Republican strategists and candidates to comprehend the post-1994 mega-shift
of Hispanics back to the Democratic party was self-inflected by Republican
candidates, and was not a result of any efforts by the Democratic party.  Most
Bush strategists believe that the relative loss of Hispanic support by
Republicans in the 1990s is a result of situational political calculations made
by Wilson and others.  Additionally, it was these actions that gave the
Democrats a chance to win back a major segment of conservative and
independent Hispanic voters who were beginning to vote for Republicans. 
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Sosa, Guerra and Tarrance believed to be successful in attracting
Hispanic voters during the 2000 presidential campaign the Bush campaign had
to follow a five-step process (Sosa 2003; Guerra 2000).  First, the Latino
community had to believe both the Bush campaign and Bush the candidate
were sensitive toward and welcoming of Latinos.  Second, the campaign,
through advertising and appearances, had to address issues relevant to the
Latino community.  Third, because of the past history of Republican
insensitivities toward Latinos, the 2000 Bush campaign would have to spend
unprecedented levels of funds on Latino outreach.  Fourth, the advertising and
outreach had to focus on Bush the individual candidate and not on Bush the
Republican party nominee.  Finally, to be successful beyond the 2000
campaign, if he won the election, the Bush administration would have to
follow through on the campaign rhetoric to demonstrated this was not just a
one time, politically expedient outreach effort.
Throughout the 2000 campaign, Guerra and Tarrance were particularly
mindful of future Republican outreach efforts to Latinos.  They viewed the
2000 Republican Latino outreach program as a first step in a 10- to 20-year
initiative that could ultimately yield a majority of Latino voters for Republican
presidential candidates on a routine basis.  They thought it would be important
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to be patient, yet vigilant and steady, when reaching out to Latino voters. 
Because of the actions and positions taken by antagonistic Republicans such
as Wilson during the 1990s, they believed it would be unlikely Bush could
regain the Republican losses of the 1990s in the short-term.  Furthermore, to
regularly attract Hispanic voters, Republicans would have to develop a long-
term strategy of engagement.
During the 2000 presidential campaign, Bush worked in an
unprecedented way for a Republican presidential candidate to create a
sensitive campaign that presented a welcoming image to Latino voters.  For
Bush to ultimately be successful in attracting Latino voters, he first had to
create an “emotional entree to voters minds” (Maceri 1999).  Bush
aggressively tried from the start to foster this welcoming atmosphere through
symbolism, style and policy positioning.  From speaking some Spanish at
almost every rally to addressing some of the issues important to Hispanics,
Bush strived to present a pro-Latino image of himself, his campaign and a
would be Bush administration.  Bush often spoke at rallies and in interviews
of the need to reach out to the Hispanic community and the need to be
sensitive to Hispanic issues.  At a speech in Los Angeles on April 7, 2000 to
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 the National Hispanic Women’s Conferences, Bush said:
It’s so important to have leadership that tears down barriers, leadership
that offers a future hopeful for everybody, leaders that reject the
politics of pitting one group of people against each other (Orlov 2000).
Unlike past Republican outreach efforts that were narrowly limited to
the Cuban-American community and which were often presented in a vacuum,
the Bush campaign was conspicuous with its Latino outreach efforts.  Michael
Madrid, a GOP consultant in California, said the Republican party “genuinely
believes that Hispanics will be a conspicuous part of the new majority [the
Bush winning coalition]” (Marinucci 2000).  This welcoming approach was
also evident at the Republican Convention in Philadelphia when several
Hispanics were showcased and a California delegate gave a prime-time speech
entirely in Spanish.  Arturo Vargas, Executive Director of the National
Association of Latino Elected Officials in Los Angeles thought Bush’s Latino
outreach efforts “should not go unnoticed” and Bush was helped by the fact
Hispanics were “all over the stage” in Philadelphia (Green 2000).  
Many supporters within the Bush campaign believed it was imperative
to create an opening with Hispanic voters early in the campaign in order to
engender credibility with Hispanic voters before the general election in
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November.  To this end, the Bush campaign kicked off their Hispanic
advertising campaign with a Spanish radio advertisement in Iowa on   
October 26, 1999.  Then on February 7, 2000, for the first time in a
presidential primary contest, the Bush campaign ran a Spanish-language
television advertisement in Arizona.  Later in the election cycle campaign, the
Bush campaign produced several television advertisements in English and
Spanish that featured George P. Bush, a nephew of George W. Bush who is
half Hispanic.  In one of these spots, George P. Bush states his uncle believes
in “opportunity for every American, for every Latino” (Meckler 2000; Sosa
2003).  Overall, the advertising outreach to Hispanic voters during the 2000
Bush campaign was unprecedented for a Republican presidential candidate. 
Beyond paid advertising activities, the Bush campaign worked determinedly to
receive pro-Latino earned media exposers, making an unprecedented number
of campaign appearances targeting Latino voters.  Sosa noted these campaign
appearances were more productive than ever in moving polling numbers (Sosa
2003).
On a policy positioning level, the second element of the overall 2000
Hispanic outreach program, Bush tried to appeal to Hispanics with “middle-
class family issues,” such as, education reform, a senior citizen prescription
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drug program, pro-military, pro-small business, self reliance, commitment to
families, Social Security reform and middle-class tax cuts.  Many within the
RNC and the Bush campaign presumed an overall package of middle-class
Republican issues would appeal to independent and conservative Hispanic
voters.  During the early stages of the campaign, Bush presented these middle-
class issues at campaign appearances, through Hispanic surrogates, and in the
general market English-language advertising.  Additionally, Bush tried to be
Latino friendly regarding Latino specific issues such as immigration and
United States-Mexico border policy issues.  Bush frequently declared he
empathized with undocumented workers entering the United States from
Mexico often saying in speeches that “[f]amily values don’t stop at the       
Rio Grande” (UPI 2000).  During the campaign, Bush often said if elected he
“will look to the South, not as an after-thought” but as a key component of
America’s foreign policy (NPR 2001).  
Late in the campaign, polling determined the two most crucial issues
for Bush to focus on were education and health-care reform.  The final two
Spanish-language television advertisements produced and placed by the RNC
addressed education and prescription drugs/health care respectively.  These
Spanish-language advertisements by the RNC were placed in several
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predictable states such as California, Florida, Nevada and New Mexico, as
well as some unexpected target markets within the states of Pennsylvania,
Washington State, Alaska, Oregon and Georgia.  These advertising spots were
targeted and purchased at the local media market unit level and were not
statewide nor national buys.  This microscopic targeting technique provides
for precise placement of media buys, which makes the advertising generally
more effective and much more cost efficient, and is reminiscent of the 1996
Clinton television and radio placements.  
The third element of the Bush Hispanic outreach program was to
develop a well-funded, highly integrated and holistic Latino advertising
campaign.  Bush’s Latino advertising outreach program included English-
language television and radio commercials, Spanish-language television and
radio commercials, as well as print advertising.  It is commonly accepted in
political advertising circles that most Hispanic voters receive the majority of
their news and political information from English-language television.  In an
attempt to address this understanding, the Bush campaign made a conscious
and concerted effort to include Hispanic images in their general market
English-language television advertising (Meckler 2000; Sosa 2003). 
Additionally, the Bush campaign created Hispanic targeted, English-language
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advertisements that used Hispanic motifs often featuring Hispanics within
group and family settings using English.  According to Hector Orci, a 
corporate Latino advertising executive, this framing is important since “the
center of the universe in Latino culture is the family” as compared to many
other racial and ethnic groups where the “individual” is the focal point,
therefore, it is critical to produce Hispanic targeted advertisements with family
and group images (Press Democrat 2000). 
The Bush advertising team produced all the Hispanic targeted
advertisements within the rubrics of the overall strategic messaging system of
the campaign, using issues the overall general market campaign was
simultaneously presenting.  Lionel Sosa, who produced Bush’s Hispanic
targeted advertisements, reported directly to Mark McKinnon, the chief media
director for the Bush campaign, and indirectly to Karl Rove, the chief political
architect of the campaign.  During the general election phase, the Bush team
ran almost all of the English-language Hispanic motif television spots in
Florida and New Mexico.  These spots were put into a rotation schedule with
the general market English-language advertisements, almost proportionate to
the percentage Hispanic population within each state.
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Beyond English-language advertisements, both the Bush campaign and
the RNC produced and placed Spanish radio and television spots.  Bush began
his Spanish-language radio advertising campaign during the Iowa caucus
campaign, thus becoming the first Republican presidential candidate to ever
use Spanish-language advertising in the state of Iowa.  The radio
advertisement starts with an announcer saying in Spanish “[o]nce again, the
spotlight is on Iowa . . . and for the first time, its shining on the Latino
community . . . we’re voters too and George W. Bush believes that all Iowans
should help elect a president.”  The advertisement continues with the
announcer saying “in this presidential campaign, you will see a fresh start, the
beginning of a new day for Latinos . . . [George Bush] believes that the
American dream belongs to everyone.”  The spot ends with George Bush
saying in Spanish “this is George W. Bush . . . it’s a new day” (David 1999;
Cross 1999). 
Bush’s Spanish-language television campaign kicked off during the
run-up to the Arizona Republican primary on February 22, 2000.  This was the
first time a Spanish-language television advertisement and a dedicated Latino
media campaign had ever been used in a presidential primary campaign (Press
Democrat 2000; Marinucci 2000).  The television spot opens with a  male
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voice-over saying in Spanish  “[e]n nuestro pais ha llegado un nuevo dia.” 
Translated to English, the advertisement says “in our country, a new day has
arrived.”  The spot focuses on Bush’s family values and ends with Bush
saying in Spanish “[e]s un nuevo dia.”  This tag line – it is a new day – was
used for two reasons.  First, the Bush campaign wanted to subtly tie Gore to
Clinton and promote the idea a Bush administration would be different from
the Clinton-Gore administration.  Secondly, the Bush campaign wanted
conservative and independent Latino voters to see Bush as “a new kind of
Republican” who was different from past  Republican presidential candidates. 
The theme of a new day and a fresh start were often used in advertisements
and campaign speeches (Bruni 1999; Sosa 2003; Guerra 2000).
Why was the Bush campaign the first ever presidential campaign to
commence its Hispanic targeted advertising program in the primary season? 
The simple answer is it was part of an overall campaign strategy to attract
Hispanic voters.  One might argue buying Spanish-language radio in Iowa is
not tactically significant since in relative terms the cost of Spanish-language
radio in Iowa is so inexpensive.  However, beyond a localized tactical
campaign decision, the Bush campaign intended strategically to send a
message to Latinos across the United States that Bush was serious about his
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desire to attract Hispanic voters both in the primary and general election
phases of the campaign.  The Bush campaign received extensive media
coverage about this decision to place Spanish-language advertisements so
early in the campaign.  
The placement of Spanish-language spots by the Bush campaign in
Arizona was also strategic because it was part of a comprehensive attempt to
eliminate McCain from the presidential Republican nomination race by
beating him in his own state.  The Bush team developed this plan after
Arizona Senator John McCain defeated Bush in the New Hampshire primary. 
In his senate campaigns, McCain had become successful in drawing Latino
voters, drawing around 55 percent of the Arizona Latino voters in 1998. 
During his 1998 senate reelection campaign, McCain used advertisements that
dubbed Spanish over his general market English spots.  The Bush campaign,
therefore, believed it was important to include Spanish-language advertising
as part of the overall strategic effort to push McCain out of the race.
Reagan’s attraction of 37 percent of the Hispanic vote in 1980,
according to the Republican party conventional wisdom, is the high watermark
for the Republican presidential candidates.  In 2000, the Republicans hoped
Bush would match or exceed Reagan’s 37 percent.  During the 2000 election,
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the Chair of the RNC, Jim Nicholson, said “[t]he Latino community is in play
in this election like never before” (Perez 2000).  Many Democrats shared
Nicholson’s view.  Los Angeles County supervisor Gloria Molina said
“[t]hese people [Latinos] are not automatic anything . . . [t]hey are certainly
not automatic Republicans and they are not automatic Democrats, either”
(Booth 2000).  Nicholson hosted several top-level campaign meetings to
develop a strategic plan to target Hispanic voters.  Beyond the Bush campaign
placement of Hispanic English- and Spanish-language targeted
advertisements, the Republican National Committee produced and placed
Spanish-language television advertisements in targeted metro markets within
battleground states.
Through polling, the Bush campaign estimated about 25 percent of
Hispanic voters were Republicans, 35 percent were independents and 40
percent were Democrats.  The Republican polling results proved to be similar
to the results found in a 1999 Washington Post national poll conducted in
conjunction with the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard
University (Booth 2000).  In this Washington Post poll, 16 percent of the
respondents described themselves as Republican, 40 percent as independents
and 44 percent as Democrats.  Additionally, the Washington Post poll reported
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that 26 percent of the respondents described themselves as liberal, 34 percent
as moderate and 34 percent as conservative.  Many Republican strategists saw
a target of opportunity since 34 percent of Hispanics self-identified as
“conservative” while only 16 percent self-identified as “Republican,” thus a
potential gain of 18 percentage points.
The Republican objective was to focus on media markets that
contained high concentrations of conservative and independent Hispanic
voters within targeted battleground states.  The Republicans had two goals
regarding Hispanic voters.  First, to attract enough Hispanic voters in targeted
battleground states to help Bush win the presidency.  Second, for Bush to
match or exceed Reagan’s 37 percent Hispanic voter support.  
Many Republican strategists believed attracting a moderate number of
traditionally pro-Democratic Latino voters to Bush would be enough to dilute
the support for Al Gore in key battleground states, and thus swing these states
to Bush.  Many Republican strategists thought Bush could successfully attract
Latino voters since Gore, at least in the beginning of the campaign, was likely
to target Latino voters through the broad prism of minority issues.  Gore’s
issue mix was skewed to attract African-American voters and was generally
less relevant to Latinos compared to African-Americans.
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The bulk of the RNC’s advertising campaign was placed in the final
month of the campaign.  Polling in the final weeks of the campaign
determined the best two issues for Republicans to focus on were education and
health-care reform.  This was true for both undecided general market voters
and conservative and moderate Latino voters.  In the final 10 days of the
campaign, the RNC produced and placed two Spanish-language television
advertisements that addressed education and prescription drugs/health care
respectively (Guerra 2000).  In California these spots appeared in the Los
Angeles, San Diego, Sacramento, Fresno and Bakersfield television markets. 
In Florida they appeared in the major markets of Miami, Orlando and Tampa. 
Additionally, these spots appeared in Nevada and New Mexico.  They also
appeared in markets within the states of Pennsylvanian, Washington State,
Alaska, Oregon and Georgia.  The Bush campaign and the RNC also produced
and placed a limited amount of Spanish-language print advertising. 
Without counting the English-language Hispanic motif television
advertisements that ran in proportionate rotation in Florida and New Mexico,
the RNC and the Bush campaign spent at least $11 million on Hispanic
outreach.  The Bush campaign spent $3.5 million on Spanish-language
television and radio and the RNC spent an additional $3.5 million on Spanish-
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language television.  The RNC and the Bush campaign also spent around $4
million on Latino grassroots outreach programs (Guerra 2000; Sosa 2003).  By
any measure, the Bush campaign spent more time strategically thinking about
Hispanic advertising outreach, spent more money on Hispanic advertising and
spent more time trying to woo Hispanic voters than any previous Republican
candidate. 
The fourth step in the overall strategic 2000 Hispanic outreach
program was to focus on Bush the individual, rather than Bush the Republican
presidential nominee.  Many strategists within the Bush campaign concluded
the best way to connect with Latinos was to emphasize Bush was a different
kind of candidate compared to past Republican presidential candidates. 
Campaign strategists believed Bush had to send a message that he was going
to make a fresh start with the Latino community by being more inclusive of
Latinos than any prior Republican presidential candidate, and to distance
himself from the Wilson philosophy of negative wedge issues.  
Gary Mendoza, former deputy mayor of Los Angeles and a California
Republican activist, said he hoped Latinos “don’t think of George W. Bush as
having an ‘R’ after his name” (Booth 2000).  This was similar to the approach
Bush used in his 1998 gubernatorial reelection campaign.  During his 1998
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reelection campaign, Bush ran two advertisements, one in English and one in
Spanish, featuring a testimonial of a Hispanic woman saying “who cares if
[Bush] is not a Democrat.”
This theme of independency was extensively showcased at the
Republican Convention in Philadelphia.  During the night that featured
cultural diversity, the Bush campaign showed an elongated feature spot
produced by Sosa.  During this spot, a Hispanic woman says  “it kind of
reminds me of the days when the Kennedy’s used to go to the Latino
neighborhoods, to our neighborhoods . . . they loved everybody and everybody
loved them . . . that’s how I feel about George W. Bush” (Sosa 2003).  During
other spots, Bush says “I am proud of the Latino blood that flows in the Bush
family.”  Bush was never described, nor identified, as a Republican in any of
the Latino English- or Spanish-language advertisements.  
Instead of focusing on Bush’s party identification, Sosa designed all
the Latino outreach advertisements to focus on four critical traits that make up
the inner-core of an ideal pro-Hispanic candidate: optimism, empathy,
strength and leadership.  Sosa asserts every president elected since 1952 beat
their opponent on a composite basis in these four areas.  Sosa asserted in 2000
that whichever candidate could convince more voters he was more optimistic,
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more empathetic, stronger and a better leader, would win the presidency.  Sosa
was convinced exposing Latinos to George Bush’s inner-core was critical, and
if done correctly, many Latinos would vote for Bush.  Beyond these four
themes, Sosa also added the theme of inclusiveness to all of the Latino
targeted English- and Spanish-language advertising.  This approach made a lot
of sense when one considers the polling research found only 16 to 25 percent
of Hispanics self-identified as Republicans, yet 34 percent of all Hispanics
self-identified as conservatives.  The fact many Latinos distrust the
Republican party can partially explain the 9- to 18-percentage point
differential between party identification and political philosophy.  The 1999
Washington Post poll found Latinos trusted Democrats by 33 percentage
points more than Republicans to do a better job in dealing with the main
problems of the nation.  Although 68 percent of Latinos self-identified as
conservative or independent, the Republican party had a major obstacle to
overcome, trust. 
The final component of the five-part strategic Latino campaign in 2000
was for Bush, if elected, to follow through on the pro-Hispanic campaign
rhetoric.  Many within the campaign believed Bush stood a good chance of
attracting more than 40 percent of the Latino voters in 2004 if he remained
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inclusive of the Hispanic community, empathetic to Hispanic issues, and
delivered on the promises made during the campaign.  However, if Bush did
not deliver, he would be open to strong attacks by the Democrats.  As Joseph
Andrew, the former DNC chair, said “the Republican party cannot, with one
ad campaign, erase the bad feelings that their anti-Hispanic record and
exclusionary rhetoric has left within the [Latino] community” (Andrew 2000). 
Bush supporters note of the 14 cabinet secretaries initially nominated
by Bush, two were Latinos.  One later withdrew her name from consideration. 
Bush also appointed a Hispanic as White House Counsel and symbolically
named him in the first round of personal staff appointments.  In a broader
context, he has signaled his desire to be more inclusive by nominating a
cabinet composed of a majority of non-white-males.  Bush’s 2001 cabinet may
be the most diverse in America’s history, at least in terms of ethnicity, race
and gender.  As for the importance of American-Mexican relations within the
overall United States foreign policy, Republicans note Bush’s first visit to a
foreign country was to Mexico.  It is clear Bush has attempted to be more
inclusive than other Republican presidents. 
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Chapter 3
A Theory of Surge-and-Decline Effects on Hispanic Peripheral Voters
Historically Hispanic turnout has been extremely low, especially relative to
Anglos and African-Americans.  In the 2000 presidential election, 61.8
percent of non-Hispanic Whites reported they voted, 55.7 percent of non-
Hispanic African-Americans reported they voted, while 45.1 percent of
Hispanic citizens reported they voted in 2000 (Census Bureau 2002b).
Unfortunately, there has not been much scholarly research as to why
the Hispanic community, the largest and fastest-growing “minority
community” in the United States, has historically had disproportionately low
turnout rates compared to both the general voting population and to other
“minority groups” such as the African-American community.  Within the
rubrics of “politics,” disproportionately low Hispanic turnout has many
ramifications that affect all levels of political interaction in the United States,
from local school board races all the way up to the election of the President.
The substantially low turnout of the Hispanic community spawns many
normative level questions and issues, especially since Hispanics are the 
United States’ largest and fastest growing minority group.  For most citizens,
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voting is the most consequential expression of personal political values as well
as the most common activity of political participation.  For many individuals
and groups with lower economic resources, voting is the most basic level of
engagement within the political and governance systems.  Ultimately the long-
term legitimization of the governmental, electoral and political systems
depend on voluntary involvement within these systems and the acceptance of
the results produced by these systems.  
Although voting is the easiest way to get involved in the political and
government systems, a disproportionately large number of Hispanic citizens
do not engage in voting.  Over the long run, if Hispanics continue to
disproportionately vote at significantly lower levels than the general populace
and other minority groups, there is a possibility there will be a loss of political
accountability accompanied by a disconnect in governance between elected
governmental leaders and the Hispanic citizenry.  For the critical issues of the
Hispanic community to be addressed, Hispanics must develop and then
maintain meaningful contact with the political and governmental systems. 
Without meaningful contact between the Hispanic community and the elected
leadership, the level of governmental accountability will deteriorate, thus
hurting the Hispanic community.
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Neither the political science literature nor the conventional wisdom of
political activism provides a simple, all-encompassing explanation of Hispanic
voter turnout.  There is not a single factor that causes high or low voter
turnouts among the Hispanic Community.  At the risk of being over simplistic,
recent theoretical attempts to explain Hispanic voting behavior can be grouped
into to two broad categories:  resource-based and mobilization-based
explanations (Shaw, de la Garza and Lee 2000).  In an attempt to more
completely explain Hispanic voter behavior, this researcher proposes a new
model of behavior that draws on both resource and mobilization explanations
while adding the concept of self- activation vis-a-vis group consciousness.
Conventional Resource Theories of Turnout  –  Primarily Based on Anglo
Research
During the last several decades a strong consensus has been built
around a series of resource models to explain political participation in general,
and voting behavior in specific.  The seminal research of the current resource
models is the classic work of Verba and Nie (1972) when they referred to the
causal relationship between socioeconomic variables and voting as the
“Standard SES Model” (Nelson 1979).  For many researchers and scholars, the
underlying set of socioeconomic status (SES) variables provide the primary
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and dominant explanation of voting levels and behavior.  Research by Verba,
Nie and other scholars have asserted citizens with higher socioeconomic status
vote at higher rates than citizens with lower socioeconomic status.  Initially,
researchers generally defined socioeconomic status as a mix of education,
income and occupation.  Early research often did not distinguish which of
these three interrelated factors were more consequential nor how these
variables interacted with each other.  The base assertion by these researchers is
high levels of socioeconomic status provide the needed resources to overcome
the impediments to access to the political system.  
In later research by Verba, Nie and Kim (1978), in their book
Participation and Political Equality, the authors report on an elaborate seven
nation research project studying political participation.  The nations studied
were Austria, India, Japan, Netherlands, Nigeria, United States and
Yugoslavia.  These researchers found individuals with high levels of social
and economic stratification hierarchies (SES variables) possessed greater
resources to be politically active.  Specifically, all else being equal, citizens
with higher socioeconomic status are more likely than individuals with lower
socioeconomic status to be politically active.  One of the main focuses of their
book is the study of how individual characteristics interact with social and
64
institutional characteristics in relation to political behavior and participation. 
The underlying premise of Verba, Nie and Kim’s research is socioeconomic
factors, which they define as socioeconomic resource level (SERL),
interrelates with voting behavior and turnout.  Specifically the more personal
resources one has, all other factors being constant, the higher the likelihood
the person will vote.  
These researchers make an interesting observation regarding voting in
the seven countries studied.  They assert in five of the seven countries studied,
SERL plays no factor in regards to voting behavior.  Yet, SERL does have a
significant correlation with voting behavior in the United States and
Yugoslavia.  They assert in the case of the United States and less so in
Yugoslavia, personal resources are critical in terms of voting behavior since it
is costly to vote (e.g., strict registration laws, voting on weekdays, complex
ballots, numerous elections, etc.).  Simply put, because of the relatively more
difficult voting processes found in the United States, as compared to the other
countries studied, personal resources are critical for the United States citizens
to overcome the impediments to voting.
The authors determined in most countries, because voting is an easy,
low-cost act, SERL is not critical as it relates to voting.  Furthermore, because
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political parties mobilize voters across all socioeconomic stratas, the voting
population sample in other countries approximates the representative views of
the broader general public.  This finding is true for voting in other countries
studied, but is less true for other forms of political participation such as
communal and election campaign activities.
In later research conducted by Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995),
the classical SES Model is further refined into a political resource
participation model in which resources include more than the traditional SES
variables of education, income and occupation.  This evolved resource model
includes resources such as time, money and civic skills.  This total package of
resources fosters and produce the essential organizational and communications
capabilities needed for political involvement in order to overcome system
impediments.  
These researchers posit these resources are initially “acquired early in
life” and “developed in the nonpolitical institutional settings of adult life: the
workplace, organizations, churches and synagogues,” and these resources are
derived from socioeconomic status (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995, 271). 
Under this model, resources are unevenly distributed throughout the SES
strata, and higher levels of SES leads to more resources available to overcome
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the impediments to voting.  Simply put, higher SES levels create more
resources, and these increases in resources are then used to overcome the
obstacles to involvement, thus increasing participation and voting.  Inversely,
lower levels of SES lead to lower involvement and voter rates.  This refined
resource model has two major improvements over the traditional SES model. 
First, this model establishes a mechanism to link SES to participation. 
Secondly, this model captures real and meaningful participation that is
otherwise missed in the traditional SES model, such as low income and poorly
educated citizens who are active in their churches or synagogues.
For years, many political activists and political scientists had argued
impediments to voter registration were the primary causes of lower voter
turnouts (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Squire, Wolfinger and Glass 1987;
Highton 1997).  They concluded the additional hurdle of voter registration
prior to voting caused low voter turnouts.  In their book Who Votes?
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) explore the importance of education level
and other SES variables as resources to overcome restrictive registration
requirements.  Among all ethnic and racial populations, Wolfinger and
Rosenstone assert older, more affluent and better educated citizens are
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relatively more like to vote (1980).  Their main finding in their book is
education is the most important and potent variable relating to turnout rates.  
Wolfinger and Rosenstone assert higher levels of education increase
voting turnout in three different ways.  First, education gives a potential voter
the intellectual capacity to analyze and understand politics.  Second, education
creates the thirst for involvement by encouraging civic responsibility.  Finally,
the education process gives the potential voter a variety of bureaucratic
experiences in which to develop skills, knowledge and persistence that will
help the potential voter to later overcome the obstacles of voter registration
laws.  Research by Teixeira (1992) and Putnam (2001) further support
Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s findings that education substantially impacts
voter turnout and strongly correlates with political participation.  Simply
stated, the training which one receives during his or her educational
experiences better prepares them to overcome the bureaucratic impediments to
voter registration and voting.
As part of their research, Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) assert
restrictive registration laws deter potential voters with lower education levels
at higher rates than potential voters with higher education levels.  This was
amplified and reinforced in the later work of Squire, Wolfinger and Glass
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(1987) in their research on residential mobility and voter turnouts.  Wolfinger
and Rosenstone as well as Squire, Wolfinger and Glass, assert if restrictive
voter registration laws were liberalized and made more permissive there
would be increases in voting rates within the ranks of relatively less educated
citizens of society and the overall voter turnout would substantially increase
by at least 9 percent. 
After much pushing and lobbying, the Motor Voter Registration Act
was passed in 1993, which required voter registration to be available at the
same time a citizen processes the paperwork for their driver’s licence and at
other government offices.  Proponents asserted decreases in the impediments
to voter registration would lead to increases in voter registration and then lead
to higher voter turnouts.  In the first four years after the Motor-Voter Act was
implemented, voter registration increased significantly, in fact, it was the
highest registration rate in any four-year period in the United States.  Yet, the
Motor-Voter reforms have not significantly lead to increases in voter turnout;
in fact, most measures indicate decreases in turnouts during this same period
(Niemi and Weisberg 2001).   
These wishful predictions that increases in voter registration would
lead to increases in voter turnout is likely flawed because it was theoretically
69
illogical to assume registration and voting are one singular act.  Timpone
(1998) argues voting has too often been considered a singular, one phase
process when it should really be considered a two phase decision process: 
phase one – to register or not to register, and phase two – if registered, to vote
or not to vote.  Although registering and voting are interlinked, they should be
considered distinct acts and processes, since a unified model which combines
registration and voting into the same analysis conceals the relationship of
many of the variables during these two stages.  Timpone’s main focus is to
disentangle the factors and variables during the registration phase from the
factors and variables during the voting phase.  Timpone posits different
variables have different effects in each of these two stages.  Clearly, the cause
of decreasing turnouts is not as simple as the hurdle of voter registration. 
Others like Wattenberg (1998) have asserted the overall voting system
of United States is too complex and not voter-friendly, which in turn leads to
lower voter turnout rates.  After comparing the United States voting system to
other industrialized countries of the world, Wattenberg posits our turnout is
low because our voting system is complex and not voter friendly.  He points
out Switzerland, the only other industrialized democracy with a relatively low
turnout rate, has similar election complexities as the United States.  He argues
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there are many aspects of the United States voting system that make it
unfriendly to voters, which in turn causes low turnouts.  These hindrances
include lack of party relevance, too many elections, too many candidates on
the ballots, a decentralized government with many different layers and levels,
special districts and use of direct referenda.  For Wattenberg’s logic to be
convincing, one would expect to see direct ties between increasing complexity
and decreasing turnouts.  However, in reality, these ties are weak, inconclusive
or non-existent.
Others such as Riker and Ordeshook (1968, 1973) and Aldrich (1993)
have worked to amend and revive rational actor explanations of turnout
behavior by trying to address the paradox of rational choice voting as
postulated by Anthony Downs (1957).  Downs’ expected utility hypothesis is
modeled as R = (BP) - C, where Reward (R) = Differential Benefit x
Probability of Occurrence (BP) - the Cost for Voting (C).  In the Downsian
rational actor paradox, it is irrational to vote since the costs of voting are
almost always more than the benefits from voting, yet millions of citizens vote
on a regular basis.  Riker and Ordeshook believe in rational choice theory;
however, they assert the Downsian model is incomplete, and it is due to this
incompleteness that the paradox arises. 
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It is through their modified Downsian model that they develop a
reinterpretation of the rational actor theory of voting.  In their calculus they
theorize it is reasonable for voters to vote and it is also reasonable for
nonvoters not to vote.  The authors study the weaknesses of the Downsian
model and assert the model above incompletely analyzes and explains the act
of voting.  Riker and Ordeshook add a variable, “D,” which signifies one’s
satisfaction from the duty of voting.  They list five “satisfactions” that can
occur for different voters:
1. Satisfaction from compliance with the ethic of voting,
2. Satisfaction from affirming the allegiance to the political
system,
3. Satisfaction from affirming a partisan preference,
4. Satisfaction from the mere act of voting (for some, the act of
voting is more a satisfaction and then it is a cost) and
5. Satisfaction from affirming one’s efficacy in the political
system.
Riker and Ordeshook thus modify the Downsian model to include the
satisfaction variable within the model: R = PB - C + D.  They then test their
model using Survey Research Center data from the 1952, 1956 in 1960
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presidential elections.  After running the data calculations, the authors assert
their modified rational choice theory accounts for most cases of voting and
non-voting.  Specifically, they posit potential voters use a rational calculus to
decide whether to vote or not to vote.  The Riker and Ordeshook’s model is a
significant improvement on the Downsian model; however, the development
of their model has potential shortcomings.  First, the asserted interrelationship
between C and D needs more defining and development.  Second, the power
of the D variable – the satisfaction from the duty of voting – is so strong in
their model, that if just R and D were studied, it is likely that for most people
R = D.  
Over the years, the Standard SES Model has evolved into a set of
modified resource theories that have often included many elements of rational
actor theories.  Recent work by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) illustrates
this new version of the resource model that includes rational actor precepts
when it asserts individuals vote or do not vote based on a calculation of utility
given the resources available to the individual and the potential derived
benefits to the individual. 
In general, resource theories explain many of the basic underlying
elements of voter turnout; however resource theories fail to completely and
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accurately explain turnout.  Furthermore, when it comes to theories of
minority voting behavior, such as African-American and Hispanic voter
turnout, resource theories significantly fail to capture the total dynamics of
minority group voting behavior and turnout.  One logical explanation as for
why resource models fail to fully explain African-American and Hispanic
turnouts is the fact almost all the resource research results are based the
predominate study of Anglo populations.  Clearly, more research and
theoretical development is needed in order to more accurately, and more
completely explain Hispanic and African-American turnout behavior. 
Mobilization Explanations of Voter Turnout Behavior
In order to develop a more complete explanation of turnout, several
scholars have posited a tie between mobilization and turnout (Rosenstone and
Hansen 1993; Shaw, de la Garza and Lee 2000; DeSipio, de la Garza and
Setzler 1999; de la Garza and DeSipio 1994).  Most of these researchers have
asserted mobilization-based models and variables can complement resource
models in order to develop a more complete model to explain voter turnout
and behavior.  
Pure resource models theoretically assert increases in education levels,
combined with reductions in structural voting barriers, will increase voter
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turnout in the United States; yet voting turnout in the United States has
declined significantly over the last four decades even though education levels
have increased and impediments have decreased.  With this type of
incompleteness in the pure resource model, researchers should embrace the
idea of complementary, explanatory variables and models in order to build
better models with more compete explanations.  
Shaw, de la Garza and Lee theorize the increases in attempts to
mobilize Latino voters by Latino groups should correlate with increases in
Latino turnout.  Their research did find support for adding a mobilization
variable to the traditional resource variables of income, age and political
attitudes.  By adding the mobilization variable, operationalized by the number
of times contacted by Latino groups, their hybrid model significantly
improved the completeness and accuracy of their model.  Many of the
theoretical underpinnings and findings of Rosenstone and Hansen’s 2001
research supports many aspects of the findings in the mobilization research by
Shaw, de la Garza and Lee.  It should also be noted in light of the significant
correlation between Latino group mobilization efforts and Latino turnout, it is
logical to theorize Hispanic voting behavior is significantly different from
Anglos.
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As to why voter turnout in the United States has continued to decrease
when education levels have continued to increase, Rosenstone and Hansen
posit the voter turnout decline in the United States is not caused by distrust in
government nor a generalized alienation from the political system.  Instead,
they assert the decline can be explained in large part because of a decline in
mobilization, political efficacy, partisan identification and satisfaction rates
with the choices of the candidates.  Rosenstone and Hansen strongly posit
there has been a dramatic decline in one-to-one, labor-intensive canvassing. 
Specifically, old school partisan mobilization efforts have declined and been
replaced by macro-media appeals.  It is because of this depersonalization of
mobilization efforts have lead to reduction in turnouts.  Rosenstone and
Hansen also point out activist social movements have also declined, which
meant there was a reduction in non-partisan group mobilization.  
The significant importance of face-to-face mobilization as a factor of
voting turnout is also supported in Gerber and Green’s (2000) research on
personal canvassing affects on voter turnout.  They assert the increase in
impersonal voter mobilization efforts of both non-partisan and partisan
organizations have been a major factor in the decrease in voter turnout.  Prior
to 1960, election campaigns were driven mostly by face-to-face contact with
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voters; yet since 1960, campaigns have used far less face-to-face tactics and
used much more macro-electronic media tactics.  Over the years, grassroots
party activists have been replaced by pollsters, media consultants and high-
tech phone banks.  Gerber and Green assert although campaigns are contacting
more voters than ever, the depersonalization of these modern campaign tactics
has contributed to the deterioration of voting turnout.
 Clearly SES attributes of individual citizens alone are not sufficient to
account for the decline in voter turnout, nor can SES variables explain why
Hispanic voter turnout is so disproportionately low compared to Anglos and
African-Americans.  The depersonalization of mobilization efforts by parties,
campaigns and social movements can significantly help to explain the
reduction in voter turnout in the overall voting electorate.  More specifically, it
is theorized the inclusion of mobilization variables improves the explanation
of Hispanic voting behavior and turnout.  However, a resource and
mobilization hybrid model remains incomplete.  For example, resource and
mobilization variables together fail to explain why Hispanics vote at rates so
much lower than African-Americans, especially when SES variables are
controlled for in the analysis.  A critical factor or set of factors is still missing
in the explanation of Hispanic voter turnout. 
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Surge-and-Decline Effects on Hispanic Peripheral Voters – The Missing
Turnout Factor 
Historically, Hispanic turnout has been extremely low, especially when
compared to Anglos and African-Americans.  Antunes and Gaitz (1975) in
their early research on Mexican-American voting behavior in Houston, found
even when socioeconomic variables are controlled for, Mexican-Americans
voted at significantly lower rates than Anglos and African-Americans.  Yet, in
spite of the significantly low turnout of the largest minority group in the
United States, scholarly political science research regarding Hispanic voting
behavior is shockingly sparse, and empirical work regarding Hispanic voter
turnout specifically has been especially sparse (Cain and Kiewiet 1984; Shaw,
de la Garza and Lee 2004; Marbut 2005).  One should note that scholars have
conducted very nominal research regarding Hispanics, yet scholars have
published a significant body of research regarding the voting behavior of
African-Americans.  
When this researcher conducted a topic search of the J-Stor electronic
storage library regarding Hispanic and African-American issues, the relative
lack of scholarly research regarding Hispanics as compared to African-
Americans was stunning.  When a J-Stor search was conducted for the nine2
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major political science journals in the J-Stor archives, this researcher found
only 14 journal articles with Hispanic(s) or Latino(s) in the title in the entire 
J-Stor archive.  For the same period of time, using the same journals, this
researcher found 124 journal articles with African-American(s) or Black(s) in
the title.  Of the 14 Hispanic journal articles found, seven of these also had
African-American(s) or Black(s) in the title too.  This meant there were only
seven articles dedicated solely to Hispanic and Latino issues while there were
117 articles dedicated solely to African-American and Black issues. 
Most resource models developed over the last four decades have
relegated non-SES variables, such as ethnicity, to inconsequential levels of
explanation, often failing to even mention ethnic and racial type variables. 
Most proponents of SES resource models do not acknowledge a role for
ethnicity nor ethnic group mobilization in their explanation models.  Yet,
researches such as Greeley assert ethnic “background is a meaningful
predictor of political participation in American society . . . [and ethnic] impact
does not go away when social class is held constant” (1974, 170).  Greeley,
strongly posits any serious analysis of voting behavior must include ethnic
variables.  In research conducted around the same time, Antunes and Gaitz
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assert “ethnicity is most important in explaining the differences” in voting
(1975, 1199).  
Nelson (1979) posits there are two major reasons why most scholars
do not include ethnicity in the development of voter behavior models.  First,
researchers are so “steeped in the normative dimensions of the ‘melting pot’
myth that they are unwilling (are unable) to conceive of ethnicity as an
enduring and important element of social division” (Nelson 1979).  Second, it
is very complex and difficult to separate the affects and effects between class
and ethnicity.  Yet, Nelson asserts normative views of the melting pot are just
myths and should not interfere with empirical research.  Nelson further asserts
even though there is a correlation between class and ethnicity, it is easy and
necessary to distinguish conceptually between ethnicity and social class
because ethnicity involves national origin, religion and race, whereas social
class involves education, wealth and income. 
Hispanics and African-Americans should not be assumed to have the
same voting behavior patterns.  However, since there has been much more
research on African-Americans, it is possible African-American research and 
studies can provide a theoretical starting point in which to develop a more
complete model of Hispanic turnout.  
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Tate (1991), in her study of African-American political participation,
asserts African-American turnout in the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections
may in part be explained by surge-and-decline effects created by the
precedent-setting campaigns of Jesse Jackson.  Tate uses a longitudinal panel
telephone study to investigate the political context of African-American voter
turnout during the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections.  She explores the
effects of traditional socioeconomic predictors like education, home
ownership and income, as well as standard predictors like age, partisanship,
political interest and political trust on voter turnout.  Tate also examines the
effects of church membership and membership in African-American political
organizations on voter turnout.  Beyond these socioeconomic, standard
predictor and contextual variables she explores the impact of Jesse Jackson’s
presidential candidacy on African-American voter turnout.  She posits the
African-American voter turnout in the 1984 presidential election, which
reached an all-time peak at 55.8 percent, can be largely explained by the
surge-and-decline effects generated by the candidacy of Jackson.  Tate asserts
this argument is similar to Angus Campbell’s 1960 surge-decline theory of
peripheral voters since African-American “peripheral voters” drop off because
of a “dissatisfaction with the electoral choices offered” (1991, 1172).
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Shaw, de la Garza and Lee (2000) assert Latino turnout can be best
explained by combining resource-based and mobilization-based models. 
These scholars develop a Latino voter turnout model that blends elements of
resource and ethnic group mobilization together.  Drawing in part on the
theoretical underpinnings of Verba, Schlozman and Brady’s (1995) resource
theory, which itself is an amalgamation of rational choice and SES models,
Shaw, de la Garza and Lee assert there are four sets of variables that can
explain Latino voter turnout.  The first three variable sets draw on resource
theory factors, specifically: political attitudes, life cycle variables such as age
and home ownership, gender, church attendance and traditional
socioeconomic variables.  The fourth variable set draws on mobilization
theory, specifically variables that measure contact by Latino activist
organizations and political parties.  Their analysis found SES, income, life-
cycle, political attentiveness, age and home ownership were powerful factors
in determining Latino turnout.  Beyond these variables, which are similar to
Anglo turnout factors, they found mobilization factors, such as contacts by
party and Latino activist organizations, were also powerful variables in
determining turnout.  Simply put, they assert SES variables alone cannot fully
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explain Hispanic turnout, and adding an ethnic group mobilization variable
provides a more complete model of explanation. 
Tate makes similar assertions in regards to African-American voters as
do Shaw, de la Garza and Lee in their Hispanic voter research.  Tate asserts
age and education are generally interconnected with African-American voter
turnout, however, Tate’s research finds African-American turnout cannot be
fully accounted for by traditional socioeconomic and demographic variables. 
Tate posits involvement in African-American organizations and membership
in politically active African-American churches provide community-based
resources that increase voter turnout.  Through organizational involvement in
the community, individuals who may be individually resource poor are still
activated and mobilized.
Tate also asserts office seeking by African-Americans positively
stimulates and increases turnout within the African-American community. 
Researchers and activists have noticed this African-American turnout
phenomenon in large city mayoral elections.  Tate theorizes we can explain
African-American voting patterns in predominantly African-American cities
in terms of this concept of surge-and-decline.  When viable African-American
candidates run in predominantly African-American communities, African-
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American voting surges because more peripheral voters are motivated and
activated to vote.  Conversely, when viable African-Americans do not run,
voting declines because peripheral voters are not motivated to vote.
Examples of African-American surge-and-decline include when    
Carl Stokes, an African-American, first ran for mayor of Cleveland in 1967. 
In his election, approximately 80 percent of all registered African-Americans
voted (Nelson 1987).  This unprecedented turnout helped lead Stokes to
victory.  In Chicago, during the 1983 election in which African-American
candidate Harold Washington was running for mayor, the African-American
voting turnout was about 85 percent (Kleppner 1985).
Tate’s (1991) surge-and-decline theory is a group empowerment,
group consciousness theory that draws heavily from the principles of the
surge-and-decline theory developed by Angus Campbell (1960) and later
modified by James Campbell (1987).  The Campbell and Campbell surge-and-
decline theory asserts voter turnout can be explained in terms of peripheral
voters who tend to vote only in high-stimulus elections, which are either high
profile campaigns or precedent-setting elections.  Specifically, since peripheral
voters lack sufficient interest to habitually vote, on the average, peripheral
voters will vote at higher rates when there is a surge of information and
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interest in a candidate.  As DeNardo (1980) describes it, peripheral voters are
simply fickle about getting to the voter both, and it takes a significant level of
activation to mobilize peripheral voters.
Bobo and Gilliam’s (1990) research supports the pivotal underlining
principles of Tate’s surge-and-decline theory.  Specifically Bobo and Gilliam
found African-Americans from high-black empowerment areas are more
active than African-Americans from low-black empowerment areas.  These
surges seem to be driven by two factors.  First, African-American candidates
campaign more actively in African-American neighborhoods.  Second, a sense
of empowerment activates voters vis-a-vis African-American group
consciousness (Shingles 1981).  In all of these cases there was a steady decline
of African-American turnout after the initial surge.  Shingles asserts the causal
connection between African-American consciousness and African-American
participation is so strong that it mostly explains why African-Americans at
times have been more politically active than Anglos when controlling
socioeconomic variables.   
One should be cautious when doing research about Hispanic turnout
not to a priori assume Hispanics and African-Americans have the same voting
behavior patterns.  These two demographic groups have very diverse historical
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origins and cultural stories in regards to their American experience.  Yet, the
effects of Hispanic community pride and group consciousness may be similar
to the African-American community during high-profile, precedent-setting
elections.  Scholars have never studied Hispanic turnout through the prism of
Surge-and-Decline effects on Hispanic peripheral voters.
It is likely surge-and-decline effects on peripheral Hispanic voters is
the missing turnout factor that more fully completes the Shaw, de la Garza and
Lee Latino turnout model.  One possible bridge between the Shaw, de la Garza
and Lee model and the model proposed in this study may be that the over-
reporters described in the Shaw, de la Garza and Lee model significantly
overlap with the peripheral voters in the surge-and-decline model.  The Shaw,
de la Garza and Lee study made some very interesting observations about the
over-reporters which is supported by the research of Silver, Anderson and
Abramson (1986).  They assert this group is composed of educated and civic
minded citizens who are politically efficacious.  These are the same factors
that strongly influence voter turnout.  These researchers suggest this group of
over-reporters is a “critical population waiting to be mobilized” (Shaw,        
de la Garza and Lee 2000, 344).  Assuming these researchers have not missed
a critical variable that explains the over-reporting, this is a very important
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observation.  Conceivably, the self-over-reporters and peripheral voters may
makeup virtually the same group of Hispanics.  The possible overlap between
over-reporters and peripheral voters who have yet to be activated should be
researched, but this is not a focus of this research. 
One final note before this researcher presents a new turnout model
based on Hispanic surge-and-decline effects on Hispanic peripheral voters.  It
is necessary for researchers to be cognizant of the biases present in Latino self-
report surveys.  The significant Latino over-reporting found in the Shaw,      
de la Garza and Lee serves as a warning to all researchers of similar topics that
the research effects of over-reporting must be addressed in the research design. 
It is thus critical to use validated survey results or actual voter turnout results,
such as results from highly concentrated Latino precincts, when studying
Hispanic turnout behavior.  
Theorized Model of Hispanic Surge-and-Decline Effects on Hispanic
Peripheral Voters 
  By including mobilization efforts of Hispanic organizations, the
Shaw, de la Garza and Lee model represents a significant improvement in
explaining Hispanic turnout and voting behavior when compared to standard
resource models.  Figure 1 illustrates a new theorized model of Hispanic
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turnout that is an extension of the Shaw, de la Garza and Lee model.  It is
theorized when the full effects of Hispanic surge-and-decline are added to the
Shaw, de la Garza and Lee model, a significantly more complete model of
Hispanic behavior is developed.
Figure 1 illustrates the proposed theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline
effects on Hispanic peripheral voters.  The top purple oval represents all the
voters who vote in a particular election, including habitual voters with high
SES and resources levels.  The violet diamond represents peripheral Hispanic
voters who are activated to vote through Hispanic surge-and-decline effects. 
The bottom light cream box represents habitual non-voters.
In Figure 1, the left blue arrow represents the mobilization effects of
Latino organizations activities that are posited in the 2000 work of Shaw,     
de la Garza and Lee.  The right red arrow represents self-activation effects vis-
a-vis group consciousness, similar to the African-American effects described
in Tate’s 1991 work.  It is necessary to note some voters are double activated
by both Latino group outreach effects and by self-activation effects of group
consciousness.  The combined effects of mobilization by Latino groups and
self-activation vis-a-vis group consciousness create the overall effects of 
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surge-and-decline on peripheral voters.  Functionally, this new theorized
model categorizes Hispanic registered voters into three sub-groups:
1. Habitual Voters – registered voters who have relatively higher
SES/Resource levels who almost always vote,
2. Peripheral Voters – registered voters who have relatively higher
SES/Resource levels who at times are activated to vote by
mobilization and/or self-activated by group consciousness
effects,
3. Habitual Non-Voters – registered voters who have relatively
lower SES/Resource levels who are perennial non-voters, and
who are not responsive to activation by the effects of
mobilization nor group consciousness effects. 
Although mobilization and group consciousness are different in form
and substance, they do certainly interact with each other.  Hispanic surge-and-
decline effects is the nexus between the uniquely Hispanic effects of
mobilization by contacts of Hispanic groups, and group consciousness and
empowerment effects created when viable Hispanic candidates run for office. 
The combining of the overall effects of Hispanic surge-and-decline with the 
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Analysis of Hispanic Voter Turnout in San Antonio Mayoral Elections
Case Study One
It is advantageous to start a study such as this one by examining local level
election data in order to tease out voting trends and tendencies occurring in
statewide and national elections that prima facie may be masked or suppressed
by extraneous factors.  An ideal jurisdiction in which to begin the examination
of the Hispanic surge-and-decline theory would be a highly populated large
city that has an embedded high percent Hispanic population and has had a
history of viable Hispanic mayoral candidates. 
There have been only a few cases of non-Cuban Hispanic candidates
who have viably run for mayor in large cities in the United States.  Of these
cases, only Federico Peña in Denver, Henry Cisneros in San Antonio and    
Ed Garza in San Antonio have successfully won their races for mayor. 
Unfortunately, there has been nominal research conducted on these elections
with viable Hispanic mayoral candidates or on Hispanic voting behavior in
relation to Mayors Cisneros, Pena and Garza.  Because San Antonio has had
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the most cases of viable non-Cuban Hispanic candidates running for mayor,
San Antonio was chosen as the jurisdiction to conduct the first case study.   
San Antonio Case Study
Like studying genetic DNA variation in Norway, San Antonio provides
an excellent forum in which to study the effects of Hispanic office seeking
candidates on, and in relation to, Hispanic voter turnout.  Hispanics have
comprised about 60 percent of the San Antonio population for decades, with
most of the Hispanic community living in highly concentrated homogeneous
geographical pockets; thus providing an ideal opportunity to isolate Hispanic
voting effects under a variety of political scenarios.  The wide assortment of
political scenarios, following the implementation of court-ordered single-
member districts in 1977, allows researchers to uniquely isolate critical voting
variables under different conditions.  Beyond the four Cisneros mayoral
elections in the 1980s, San Antonio has had other viable Hispanic contenders
run for mayor.  In 1991, sitting Councilperson Maria Berriozabal narrowly lost
the mayor’s race in a run-off election, and then in 1997, community activist
Maria Elena Torralva and sitting Councilperson Henry Avila both ran
unsuccessful bids for mayor.  Then in 2001, sitting Councilperson Ed Garza
successfully won his race for mayor.  
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The focus of this research is to determine if there is evidence of surge-
and-decline effects on Hispanic peripheral voters.  Specifically, this research
measures the effects of viable Hispanic mayoral candidates on Hispanic
turnout.  It is theorized the surge-and-decline effects on Hispanic peripheral
voters can – at least in part – explain Hispanic turnout behavior.  If Hispanic
turnout significantly rises when a viable Hispanic mayoral candidate runs and
decreases when no viable Hispanic mayoral candidates run, one can argue the
data supports the theory of surge-and-decline effects within the San Antonio
Hispanic voting community.  Additionally, it is hypothesized turnout will
steadily drop after precedent-setting elections.  This study defines these
elections as desensitizing elections.
Time Series Analysis of the Last 13 San Antonio Mayoral Elections
This paper studies all 13 of the San Antonio mayoral elections after
court ordered single-member district elections were implemented in 1977. 
The data is from the general mayoral elections, which are held in April or May
during odd number years (San Antonio City Clerk 1977, 1979, 1981, 1983,
1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001).  In order to minimize
extraneous variables, run-off elections are not studied.  
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In 1977, San Antonio’s total population was less than one million.  By
2001, San Antonio’s population was more than one million, making it one of
the 10 most populous cities in the United States.  During the time of this
study, Hispanics comprised about 58 percent of the population, Anglos about
34 percent, African-Americans about 7 percent and other ethnic groups about
1 percent.  Additionally, in gross population terms, San Antonio has been the
third to fifth largest Hispanic city in the United States during the years of this
study (Census Bureau Report 2004b). 
The mayor of San Antonio serves two-year terms, and since 1991, the
office is limited to two terms.  As with most Texas cities, San Antonio
mayoral elections are nonpartisan.  Prior to single-member districting in     
San Antonio, the Good Government League (GGL), nominated and promoted
every successful candidate for mayor for more than two decades, with just one
exception.  The court-ordered, single-member districting in 1977 led to the
ultimate downfall of the GGL.  The fall of the GGL created an environment
where sub rosa race politics became a proxy for traditional partisan politics.  
Since San Antonio elections are non-partisan, party identification effects are
almost non-existent, while ethnic and racial effects are strong.
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In order to isolate the behavioral effects of Hispanic voters from Anglo
voters, United States Census data is used to identify census tracts that
remained 80 percent or more Hispanic for the time of the study (Census
Bureau Report 2001b).  The census tracts that are more than 80 percent
Hispanic are overlaid on top of San Antonio voting precinct maps.  These
steps are repeated to identify the 80 percent or more Anglo voting precincts. 
Fortuitously, the census tracts and precincts line up almost perfectly.  Of the
193 highly concentrated precincts identified in 2001, only four precincts do
not line up with the census tracts.   In order to maximize relative ethnic3
homogeneity, these four precincts are excluded from the data analysis.  The
precincts studied are then divided and grouped into Hispanic and Anglo
precincts with the voting results tabulated for each election.  The precinct
level deltas, the election-to-election changes for each precinct, are then
calculated.  The accumulated Hispanic and Anglo results are then averaged for
each election.  
It is critical to note using actual voting results from highly
concentrated Hispanic and Anglo precincts, rather than data from self-report
studies, allow researchers to control for the variances caused by self-over-
reporting survey data.  Furthermore, it is critical to note the use of election-to-
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election delta data provides additional controls for extraneous factors, such as
SES variables, which isolates election-to-election effects. 
These 13 elections are then divided into three different groups of
elections: projected Hispanic surge elections, projected Hispanic decline
elections and projected Hispanic desensitizing elections.  Based on the theory
of surge-and-decline on Hispanic peripheral voters, surge elections are
projected in the years when viable Hispanic candidates are running in their
first race for mayor.  The 1981, 1991, 1997 and 2001 elections are classified
as projected Hispanic surge elections since Henry Cisneros in 1981,        
Maria Berriozabal in 1991, Maria Elena Torralva in 1997 and Ed Garza in
2001 respectively ran for their first time for mayor of San Antonio.  There are
two sub-types of surge elections.  The first type is the first time effort of any
viable Hispanic candidate to run for mayor, Cisneros in 1991.  The second
type includes the later elections that involve first time individual efforts by
other viable Hispanic candidates trying to win the office that was won by
Cisneros earlier.  
Since the 1977 election is the first single-member district election held
in San Antonio’s history, one can logically argue it should be considered a
surge election since it is both a high-profile election and a precedent-setting
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election with racial and ethnic undertones.  However, since this is the first year
of single-member districting, there is no way to develop an accurate baseline
in which to compare the 1977 election against; therefore the 1977 election is
not coded as a surge election.  
The 1979, 1989, 1993, 1995 and 1999 elections are classified as
projected Hispanic decline elections since no viable Hispanic candidates ran
for mayor.  The Cisneros mayoral reelection campaigns from 1983 through
1987 are classified as projected Hispanic desensitizing elections.  The results
for Hispanic and Anglo voters are then analyzed and graphed by election-to-
election and percentage voter turnout change.
Findings of the Time Series Analysis of the 13 San Antonio Mayoral
Elections
The most important finding is all the projected surge-and-decline
elections studied conform to the hypothesized projections of Hispanic surge-
and-decline theory [see Figure 2].  The data strongly supports the surge-and-
decline theory of Hispanic voting behavior, both in real terms and in relative
terms to Anglo voting behavior. 
For all the projected surge elections, the average election-to-election
Hispanic voter turnout increase is 93.0 percent which is significantly higher
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than the Anglo voter turnout increase of 37.9 percent [see Figure 2]. 
Furthermore, Hispanic “surges” are higher in all four projected surge elections
than Anglo increases [see Figure 3].  Conversely, and supportive of the
Hispanic surge-and-decline theory, for the projected decline elections, the
average Hispanic election-to-election decline of -43.2 percent is a significantly
greater decrease than the average Anglo decrease of -21.2 percent [see Figure
2].  Additionally, the Hispanic declines are greater than the Anglo decreases in
each and every projected decline election [see Figure 4].
For the sequence of desensitizing elections the average percentage
decline in Hispanic turnout is -5.2 percent [see Figure 2].  This drop clearly
supports the notion of slight declines during desensitizing elections.  Of the
projected Hispanic desensitizing elections studied, only the 1983-85 election
sequence initially appears not to fit the theory [see Figure 5].  A possible
explanation for this aberration is the fact the 1983 election is the only election
in the 13 elections studied when there is no viable Anglo candidate for mayor,
thus possibly explaining the Anglo “surge” in the following election when a
viable Anglo ran.  This explanation is noteworthy since the 1983 election is
the only election, of the 13 elections studied, that Hispanic turnout exceeded 
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Anglo turnout.  During this election, Hispanic turnout exceeded the Anglo
turnout by 7.0 percentage points [see Table 1].  
Initially, it appears the 1983-85 desensitizing election sequence may
not appear to fit the projected model; however, in relative terms, with no
“viable Anglo” running, one can argue that the 1983 Hispanic data compared
to the 1983 Anglo data actually fits the model of surge-and-decline with the
Anglo turnout declining because there is no viable Anglo running.  Overall,
the time series analysis data of the 13 elections from 1977 through 2001
strongly supports the theory of surge-and-decline effects on Hispanic
peripheral voters in San Antonio mayoral elections.  When there is a viable
Hispanic running, Hispanic turnout goes up, when there is no viable Hispanic
running, the turnout goes down.
In the San Antonio case study, there are two sub-types of surge
elections, one involves the first time effort of any viable Hispanic candidate to
run for mayor, Cisneros in 1991, and later elections that involve first time
individual efforts by other viable Hispanic candidates trying to win the office
that was won by Cisneros earlier.  The time series analysis suggests there is no
statistical distinguishing difference between these two types of surge elections. 
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San Antonio Regression Analyses of the 1991 through 2001 Elections
In addition to the time series analysis of highly homogenous precincts
above, multiple regression analyses are utilized to study precinct-to-the-same-
precinct net turnout change between the six mayoral elections from 1991
through 2001 for all precincts.  In order to isolate the hypothesized possible
effects of surge-and-decline at the most discrete level, the net percentage point
change in voter turnout for the same precinct on an election-to-election basis
is used as the dependent variable.  
It is very important to note that this novel research design compares
same-precinct-to-same-precinct data on an election-to-next-election basis, thus
controlling for most extraneous factors such as changes in SES variables,
demographic variances and over reporting, which allows for a more discreet
and meaningful study of possible surge-and-decline effects. 
Precinct-by-precinct data from the San Antonio City Clerk for voter
turnout and voter registration is used to calculate turnout for each precinct, for
each of the six elections studied (San Antonio City Clerk 1991, 1993, 1995,
1997, 1999, 2001).  The net change in percentage point turnouts for each
precinct on an election-to-election basis is then calculated and used as the
dependent variable (election-to-election percentage point change).  Precincts
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with raw turnouts of less than nine voters and raw registration of less than 100
people are excluded from the study in order to control for possible errant
variances caused by precincts with disproportionately low populations. 
Several independent variables are then analyzed in relation to the net
turnout change dependent variable.  The first independent variable used,
Viable Hispanic Dummy, is a dummy variable for change in viable Hispanic
mayoral candidate running status (e.g., no viable Hispanic to viable Hispanic,
viable Hispanic to no viable Hispanic or no change).  The second independent
variable used, Incumbency Dummy, is a dummy variable for change in
mayoral incumbency running status (e.g., no incumbent to incumbent,
incumbent to no incumbent or no change).  An interaction term is also created
for the interaction variable between the viable Hispanic dummy and the
incumbency dummy.  The final independent variable in the model, percent
registered Hispanic, uses precinct level ethnic data from the “Federal
Elections Project” (Lublin and Voss 2001).
  Based on the theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline, it is hypothesized
there will be a positive and significant correlation between the net change in
the turnout dependent variable with the viable Hispanic dummy independent
variable and with the percent registered Hispanic independent variable. 
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Additionally, based on prior research by other scholars, it is hypothesized
there will also be correlation with the change in incumbency independent
variable.  Specifically, when there is an incumbent, turnout will drop.  It is
also hypothesized there could be a small correlation between the change in
turnout dependent variable with the interaction term between the viable
Hispanic and incumbency variables.
San Antonio Findings Support Hispanic Surge-and-Decline Theory
The results of the linear regression analyses of turnout change on an
election-to-election basis between the six San Antonio mayoral elections from
1991 through 2001 also strongly support the fundamental concepts of the
theory of surge-and-decline on Hispanic peripheral voters.  When regressing
the net change in voter turnout dependent variable with the hypothesized
model using the four independent variables described above (e.g., viable
Hispanic, incumbency, the interaction between viable Hispanic and
incumbency and percent registered Hispanic), the model’s R  value is .575,2
with all four independent variables significant at the 99.9 percent confidence
level [see Table 2].   
Furthermore, when the percent registered Hispanic variable and the
combined interaction term are controlled for, the partial correlation coefficient
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between the viable Hispanic running variable and the percent turnout change
variable is .6999, and is significant at the 99.9 percent confidence level.
The results of these regressions are instructive because they illuminate
the underlying mechanics of the surge-and-decline theory in which the viable
Hispanic mayoral candidate dummy variable and the percent registered
Hispanic variable are both significantly and positively correlated with the net
percentage change in the dependent variable.  
The analysis also found a relatively smaller correlation between
incumbency and turnout.  It should be noted the standard coefficient for the
viable change in Hispanic running dummy variable is 271 percent larger than
the coefficient for the change in the incumbency dummy variable.  Thus,
Hispanic surge-and-decline effects are significantly more robust than
incumbency effects.
Simply put, when a viable Hispanic runs for mayor in San Antonio,
Hispanic voting turnout surges both in real terms and relative to Anglo surges. 
Whereas, when no viable Hispanic candidates run, Hispanic turnout declines
both in real terms and relative to Anglo declines.  There needs to be further
research of elections in other jurisdictions to determine if the strong support of 
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surge-and-decline theory found in the San Antonio case study can be
generalized to a wider set of elections, populations and jurisdictions.
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Chapter 5
Analysis of Hispanic Turnout in New Mexico Gubernatorial Elections
Case Study Two
In order to test the generalizability of the Hispanic surge-and-decline theory
beyond the confines of mayoral elections in San Antonio, the New Mexico
gubernatorial elections from 1990 through 2002 are analyzed vis-a-vis the
prism of Hispanic surge-and-decline theory.  Similar to San Antonio,        
New Mexico has a high percent Hispanic population and has had a variety of
viable Hispanic candidates run for governor, thus providing a conceptually
rich setting in which to study Hispanic surge-and-decline theory.  
According to the United States Census Bureau, Hispanics and Latinos
comprised 42.1 percent of the New Mexico population in 2000 (Census
Bureau Report 2004c).  In addition to having a high Hispanic percentage of
population, there have also been several Hispanic candidates who have run for
Governor including Bill Richardson, a Democrat who won in 2002 and former
Secretary of Energy, Martin Chavez a Democrat Party candidate in 1998 and
Mayor of Albuquerque, and Roberto Mondragon a Green Party candidate in
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1994 and former Lieutenant Governor.  Interestingly, since statehood in 1912,
New Mexico has elected five Hispanic governors.
New Mexico Case Study
In 1990, former Democratic Governor Bruce King won his third non-
consecutive term for governor over Republican Frank Bond, 54.7 percent to
45.3 percent respectively (New Mexico Secretary of State 1990).  However, in
1994, incumbent Governor King lost his reelection bid to Republican       
Gary Johnson, who had never held political office before and was not
expected to win.  Johnson’s surprise win can mostly be explained by the
strong third-party candidacy of Green party candidate Roberto Mondragon. 
Mondragon, a former Democratic Lieutenant Governor of New Mexico turned
Green party gubernatorial candidate, received more than 10 percent of the
1994 vote thus causing incumbent Democrat King to lose (New Mexico
Secretary of State 1994).  Mondragon’s strong showing within the Hispanic
community may in part be explained by the fact that neither the Democratic
nor the Republican parties had a Hispanic candidate running for governor.
Incumbent Governor Johnson, in his 1998 reelection bid, beat
Democratic challenger Martin Chavez, former Mayor of Albuquerque, 54.5
percent to 45.5 percent respectively (New Mexico Secretary of State 1998). 
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Due to term limits, incumbent Governor Johnson was not able to run for
reelection, thus creating an open gubernatorial seat.  In 2002, the Republicans
nominated John Sanchez, a freshman state legislator from Albuquerque, to run
for governor.  On the Democratic side, former Secretary of Energy and former
New Mexico United States Congressman Bill Richardson was nominated. 
This was the first time since 1918 that both the Republican and Democratic
candidates for governor were Hispanic.  Richardson won overwhelmingly 55.5
percent to Sanchez’s 39.1 percent (New Mexico Secretary of State 2002).
Like the San Antonio case study, the purpose of the New Mexico case
study is to determine if there is evidence of Hispanic surge-and-decline
effects.  It is hypothesized Hispanic surge-and-decline effects can – at least in
part – explain Hispanic turnout behavior.  If Hispanic turnout significantly
rises when a viable Hispanic gubernatorial candidate runs and decreases when
no viable Hispanic gubernatorial candidates run, one can argue the data
supports surge-and-decline effects within the New Mexico voting community. 
Furthermore strong support of Hispanic surge-and-decline effects would exist
if there is a positive correlation between the interaction term composed of the
viable Hispanic running variable and the percent of Hispanic population
variable with the net change in turnout dependent variable. 
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Since only two counties have Hispanic populations of more than 80
percent and there are five counties with significantly high Native-American
percent of populations, the use of the 80 percent threshold time series analysis
used in the San Antonio case study to isolate the effects between Hispanics
and Anglos is not feasible for the New Mexico case study.   However, the use
of regression analysis is both feasible and instructive. 
New Mexico Regression Analyses of the 1990 through 2002 Elections
This study analyzes the last four gubernatorial elections in             
New Mexico from 1990 through 2002.  The data used is from November
general elections in non-presidential election years (New Mexico Secretary of
State 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002).  New Mexico governors serve a term of four
years, and are allowed to serve up to two consecutive terms.  By the year 2000,
according to the United States Census Bureau, New Mexico had a population
of more than 1.8 million people, approximately 44 percent Anglo, 43 percent
Hispanic, 10 percent Native-American and 4 percent other (Census Bureau
Report 2004c).  In terms of percent of population, New Mexico has the
highest proportion of Hispanic population compared to any other state in the
United States.  
108
The regression analyses conducted for the New Mexico case study are
relatively similar to the regression analyses in the San Antonio case study. 
The major difference in the analytical method used between these two case
studies is county level data is used in New Mexico, whereas precinct level
data is used in the San Antonio case study.  County level data is used because
there is no similar validated precinct level data for New Mexico as there is for
Texas in the “Federal Elections Project” precinct level data.  Multiple
regression analyses are utilized to study county-to-the-same-county net turnout
change among the four gubernatorial elections from 1990 through 2002.  In
order to isolate the hypothesized possible effects of surge-and-decline, the net
percentage point change in voter turnout for the same county on an election-
to-election basis is used as the dependent variable.
New Mexico Secretary of State voter turnout and voter registration
data on a county-by-county basis is used to calculate turnout for each county,
for each of the four elections studied (New Mexico Secretary of State 1990,
1994, 1998, 2002).  The net change in percentage point turnout for each
county on an election-to-election basis is then calculated and used as the
dependent variable (election-to-election percentage point change).
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The New Mexico case study uses the same basic model used in the 
San Antonio case study with just one important modification to address
multicollinearity.  Both the Incumbency Dummy variable (e.g., change in
gubernatorial incumbency running status) and the interaction variable are
dropped from the model, and are replaced with a newly created interaction
variable among the viable Hispanic dummy, the incumbency dummy and
percent Hispanic Population variables.  The Viable Hispanic Dummy, which
represents the change in viable Hispanic gubernatorial candidate running
status, is still used (e.g., no viable Hispanic to viable Hispanic, viable
Hispanic to no viable Hispanic or no change).  The third independent variable,
Percent Hispanic Population, is used as a proxy for Hispanic voter
registration in the New Mexico case study.
Since this research design compares same-county-to-county data on an
election-to-next-election basis, many of the external variances, such as self-
overreporting and changes in SES factors, are controlled for, thus allowing for
a better isolation of possible surge-and-decline effects.  Furthermore, in order
to isolate the Hispanic effects from Anglo effects, the five counties with high
and above average Native-American populations are dropped from the
analyses.  Additionally, counties with raw turnouts of less than 3,000 voters
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are excluded from the study in order to control for possible errant variances
caused by counties with extremely disproportionately low populations. 
Based on the theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline, it is hypothesized
there will be a positive and significant correlation between the net change in
the turnout dependent variable with the viable Hispanic gubernatorial
candidate running variable.  It is also hypothesized there will be a correlation
between the dependent variable and the interaction term among the Hispanic
dummy, the incumbency dummy and percent Hispanic Population variables.  
New Mexico Findings Support Hispanic Surge-and-Decline Theory
The results of the linear regression analyses on an election-to-election
basis among the four gubernatorial elections from 1990 through 2002 strongly
support the theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline on Hispanic peripheral
voters.  When regressing the net change in voter turnout dependent variable
with the hypothesized two variables described above (e.g., the viable Hispanic
dummy and the interaction variable between viable Hispanic running,
incumbency and county percent Hispanic variables) the model’s R  value is2
.738, with both independent variables being significant at the 99.9 percent
confidence level [see Table 3].
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As with the San Antonio case study, the New Mexico analysis yields a
robust and significant standard coefficient of .823 for the viable Hispanic
candidate running independent variable [see Table 3].  Additionally, similar to
the San Antonio case study, the New Mexico analysis also shows a correlation
between incumbency and percent Hispanic population through the interaction
term which has a standardized coefficient of .254 [see Table 3].  The stand
alone Hispanic population variable is not found to be significant.
Overall, the regression analyses support the anecdotal information,
such as in the 1994 gubernatorial election, that when a viable Hispanic runs
for governor in New Mexico, Hispanic voting turnout surges, and when no
viable Hispanic candidate runs, turnout declines. 
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Chapter 6
Analysis of Hispanic Voter Turnout in Colorado Senatorial Elections
Case Study Three
In order to affirm the generalizability of the Hispanic surge-and-decline
theory, the sequence of Colorado senatorial elections from 1992 through 2004
is used as the third case study.  The use of Colorado senatorial elections
expands the analysis of this research to a third state, to a third type of election
and to a third level of governmental election data.  As with the San Antonio
and New Mexico case studies, the Colorado case study analyzes elections
through the prism of Hispanic surge-and-decline theory. 
Colorado Case Study
 According to the United States Census Bureau, Hispanics and Latinos
comprised 17 percent of the population of Colorado in 2000 (Census Bureau
Report 2004d).  The same report shows the Anglo percent of population at   
69 percent, with all other racial groups at 14 percent.  In addition to having a
sizable Hispanic voting block, the Colorado case study of senatorial elections
from 1992 through 2004 ends with the hypothesized surge election of        
Ken Salazar.  The 2004 election of Democrat Salazar is one of the few  
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United States Senate elections to ever have had a viable Hispanic candidate
run, thus providing a hypothesized surge election to study at the United States
Senate level.  Additionally, the Colorado senatorial case study provides an
unique opportunity to look at the effects, correlations and interactions with
overlapping presidential campaigns that neither the San Antonio case study
nor the New Mexico case study provide.
This case study starts with the 1992 Senate election to fill the seat of
retiring Democratic Senator Tim Worth.  In this election, Democrat           
Ben Nighthorse Campbell defeated Republican candidate Terry Considine
51.8 percent to 42.7 percent (Colorado Secretary of State 1992).  In the next
Senate election in 1996 to fill the seat of retiring Republican Senator       
Hank Brown, Republican Wayne Allard defeated Democrat Tom Strickland
51.1 percent to 46.1 percent respectively.  The 1998 Senate election is
noteworthy because incumbent senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell had
switched parties and was now running as a Republican against Democrat
Dottie Lamm.  Senator Campbell defeated Lamm 63.0 percent to 35.3 percent. 
In the 2002 Senate race, the final result was almost an exact replay of the 1996
election since now incumbent Republican Allard defeated challenger
Strickland 51.0 percent to 46.0 percent.  The final election analyzed in this
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sequence of elections was the 2004 election between Democrat Ken Salazar
and Republican Pete Coors.  In this election, Salazar defeated Coors 51.3
percent to 46.5 percent.
Like the prior two case studies of San Antonio and New Mexico, the
purpose of the Colorado case study is to determine if there is evidence of
surge-and-decline effects on Hispanic peripheral voters.  This case study
analyzes the effects of having no viable senatorial Hispanic candidates running
during the 1992 through 2002 elections compared to having a viable senatorial
Hispanic candidate run in the 2004 race.  It is hypothesized Hispanic surge-
and-decline effects can partially explain Hispanic turnout behavior in
this sequence of Colorado senatorial elections studied.  Specifically, it is
hypothesized there will be a surge in the 2004 Hispanic voter turnout relative
to the Anglo turnout relative to the other elections in the sequence studied. 
Furthermore, it is hypothesized there will be moderate interaction effects
between turnout and the independent variables relating to presidential election
years and the incumbency status of the senatorial candidates.  
Similar to the San Antonio case study, the Colorado senatorial study
conducts a time series analysis of high percent of population Hispanic counties
compared to high percent of population Anglo counties.  As with the          
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San Antonio and New Mexico case studies, regression analyses are also
utilized.  As with the prior two case studies, all the election data and dummy
terms are coded in terms of election-to-election changes thus controlling for
most of the extraneous effects.  Finally, like the New Mexico case study, the
Colorado data uses county level data.
Time Series Analysis of the Last Five Colorado Senatorial Elections
In order to isolate the behavioral effects between Hispanic voters and
Anglo voters, United States Census data is used to identify counties with high
percent of Hispanic populations and counties with high percent of Anglo
populations (Census Bureau Report 2004d).  Unlike the San Antonio case
study, Colorado has no counties with 80 percent or more Hispanic population,
therefore the 80 percent threshold method used in the San Antonio case study
cannot be used.  However, unlike the New Mexico case study, there are no
counties with high percent of Native-American populations, therefore there
are no methodological complexities caused by high Native-American percent
of populations in Colorado.  For this case study, the top eight counties with the
highest percent of Hispanic population are coded as high Hispanic counties
while the top eight counties with the highest percent of Anglo population are
coded as high Anglo counties.
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The percent of populations for the high Hispanic counties range from
38 to 68 percent Hispanic, while the percent of populations for the high Anglo
counties range from 93 to 97 percent Anglo.  This segmentation provides a
clear delineation between high Hispanic counties and high Anglo counties in
which to conduct the analysis.  The county level election-to-election changes
for each county are then calculated.  The accumulated results for the set of
Hispanic counties and the set of Anglo counties are then averaged for each
election.
Again, it is crucial to note that using actual voting results from highly
concentrated Hispanic and Anglo counties, rather than self-reporting data,
allows researchers to control for variances caused by self-over-reporting
survey data.  Furthermore, the use of election-to-election delta changes, on a
county-to-same-county basis, provides additional controls for extraneous
factors, thus providing better isolation for the effects being studied.
The four election-to-election sequences for these five elections are then
classified as either projected surge elections or projected decline elections
depending on the election-to-election change in viable Hispanic candidate
running status.  The election sequences from 1992 through 2002 are all
classified as decline elections since there are no viable Hispanic candidates
117
running.  Since Ken Salazar ran as the Democratic candidate in 2004 and there
was no viable Hispanic candidate in 2002, the 2002 to 2004 election sequence
is then classified as a surge election.  The results of the Hispanic and Anglo
counties are then aggregated, analyzed and graphed based on election-to-
election percentage change.  The surge-decline measurement for Colorado is
scaled using percentage point change, which is different from the San Antonio
case study that used percent of change.  San Antonio necessitated percent
change since there is a multitude of relative changes in the surge-
desensitizing-decline projections. 
Findings of the Time Series Analysis of the Colorado Elections
Of the four election delta sequences studied, three significantly
conform to the hypothesized projections of Hispanic surge-and-decline theory
[see Figure 6], while the fourth, the 1996 to 1998 election sequence, is
statistically inconclusive.  More important, when the three projected decline
elections are averaged and compared to the 2000 to 2004 projected surge
election sequence, the findings are robust, both in real terms and in relative
terms to Anglo voting behavior [see Figure 7].
Overall, the time series analysis data of the five Colorado senatorial
elections from 1992 through 2004 strongly support the theory of surge-and-
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decline effects on Hispanic peripheral voters.  When there is a viable Hispanic
senatorial candidate running, Hispanic turnout goes up, both in real terms and
relative to Anglo turnout.  Whereas, when there is no viable Hispanic
senatorial candidate, Hispanic turnout is lower on an average relative to Anglo
turnout. 
Colorado Regression Analyses of the 1992 through 2004 Elections
In addition to the time series analysis above, multiple regression
analyses are utilized to study county-to-same-county net turnout change data
among the five Senatorial elections from 1992 to 2004.  In order to isolate the
hypothesized possible effects of surge-and-decline, the change in the net
percentage point of voter turnout for the same county on an election-to-
election basis is used as the dependent variable.  This novel research design of
comparing county-to-county data, on an election-to-election basis, controls for
most extraneous variances such as changes in SES variables and over-self-
reporting.
County-by-county turnout and voter registration data from the
Colorado Secretary of State is used to calculate turnout for each county, for
each of the five elections studied (Colorado Secretary of State 1992, 1996,
1998, 2002, 2004).  The net change in percentage point turnout for each
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county on an election-to-election basis is then calculated and used as the
dependent variable (election-to-election percentage point change).  This is the
same dependent variable used in the San Antonio and New Mexico case
studies. 
The Colorado case study uses a similar base model, with similar
independent variables used in the New Mexico case study, with one important
modification to the Colorado model.  Of the five elections studied, the 1992,
1996 and 2004 senatorial elections overlap presidential elections, whereas the
1998 and 2002 senatorial elections do not overlap presidential elections. 
Therefore, unlike the New Mexico case study, which has no overlapping
presidential elections, the Colorado model must include modeling for
presidential elections.  In order to prevent multicollinearity while addressing
the overlapping presidential elections, an interaction variable is constructed
between an incumbency dummy and a presidential election dummy.  Like both
the San Antonio and New Mexico case studies, the viable Hispanic dummy,
which represents the change in viable Hispanic candidate status, is still used. 
Additionally, the third independent variable, percent Hispanic population, is
used as a proxy for Hispanic voter registration.  
120
As with the New Mexico case study, the Colorado case study uses
county-to-county level.  Also like the New Mexico case study, counties with
raw turnouts of less than 3,000 voters are excluded from the study in order to
control for possible errant variances caused by counties with extremely low
populations and relatively disproportionate weightings. 
Based on the theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline, it is hypothesized
there will be a positive and significant correlation between the net change in
turnout dependent variable with the viable Hispanic senatorial candidate
running independent variable.  It is also hypothesized there could be a
correlation between the net change in turnout dependent variable and the
interaction term between incumbency and presidential election.  It is unknown
whether the interaction term will be positive or negative since the presence of
overlapping presidential campaigns could be hypothetically positive whereas
the incumbency status could be hypothetically negative.
Colorado Findings Support the Theory of Hispanic Surge-and-Decline
The results of the linear regression analyses on an election-to-election
basis among the five senatorial elections from 1992 through 2004 strongly
support the theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline on Hispanic peripheral
voters.  When regressing the net change in voter turnout dependent variable
121
with the hypothesized independent variables described above (e.g., the viable
Hispanic dummy and the interaction term between incumbency and
presidential elections) the model’s R  value is .814, with both independent2
variables being significant at the 99.9 percent confidence level [see Table 4].
Similar to both the San Antonio and New Mexico case studies, the
Colorado analysis yields a robust and statistically significant standard
coefficient of .738 for the viable Hispanic candidate running independent
variable [see Table 4].  As hypothesized, there is a correlation between the
dependent variable and the interaction term that incorporates incumbency and
presidential elections.  The standard coefficient for the interaction variable is -
.243 [see Table 4].  The stand alone Hispanic population variable is not found
to be significant.
Both the time series analysis and the regression analyses of the five
most recent Colorado senatorial elections strongly support the theory of surge-
and-decline on Hispanic peripheral voters.  Specifically, when a viable
Hispanic senatorial candidate runs for office, the data strongly indicates
Hispanic voting turnout surges, and when no viable Hispanic candidate runs,
turnout declines.
122
It is important to note that if one were to take into account the recent
increases in the non-citizen population in Colorado, the results of the
Colorado case study would likely be even more robust than the results
contained in this study since their could be a statistical dampening effect. 
Although the issue of non-citizenship is not the focus of this study, noting the
possibility that the underlying results may even be more robust is important,
since it would strengthen the argument of this study.  Because San Antonio
and New Mexico have had relatively smaller increases in the non-citizen
population than Colorado, the San Antonio and New Mexico results would
likely not be effected as much as the Colorado results.
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Chapter 7
The Theory of Surge-and-Decline:
A Powerful Tool to Understand Hispanic Voting Behavior
There are several critical factors and trends that have made the Hispanic
voting community one of the most important political demographic groups in
United States politics, especially in recent presidential elections.  The
foremost reason for the increased importance of the Hispanic community is its
sheer size.  Beyond being the largest racial or ethnic minority group in the
United States, the Hispanic community is also the fastest growing minority
group, both in terms of the overall population and in terms of the voting
electorate.  
The fact that the Hispanic population in the United States is mostly
concentrated in 11 states with a total of 217 Electoral College Votes also helps
to explain the increase in the targeting of Hispanic voters by the Republican
party, as well as the renewed interest in the Hispanic vote by the Democratic
party.  Of these 11 highly concentrated Hispanic states, four of them remained
“battleground” states throughout the 2004 presidential campaign.  These four
states, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada and Florida, contain a total of 47
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Electoral College Votes, and are comprised of 42 percent, 25 percent,          
20 percent and 17 percent Hispanic respectively.  
The Hispanic Surge-and-Decline Effects Model – a More Complete Model
Hispanics have lower SES resources, such as education and income,
relative to Anglos, but so do African-Americans, yet African-Americans vote
at significantly higher rates than Hispanics.  Furthermore, many studies have
shown when SES variables are controlled for, African-Americans have at
times voted at rates even higher than Anglos in the post civil rights era, while
Hispanic voter turnout significantly and traditionally lags behind both Anglos
and African-Americans.  Traditional SES resource type models alone fail to
capture the total dynamics of minority group voting behavior and turnout. 
One logical explanation as for why traditional resource models fail to
adequately explain African-American and Hispanic voting behavior is almost
all the research on resource models is predominately based on the study of
Anglo sample populations.  Shaw, de la Garza and Lee’s model, which adds
mobilization explanations to traditional resource explanations, makes a
significant improvement in explaining Hispanic voter turnout; however, their 
model is still incomplete.  
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In an attempt to more completely explain Hispanic voter turnout, this
researcher postulates a new construct that draws on both resource and
mobilization explanations while adding the concept of self-activation vis-a-vis
group consciousness.  The theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline effects on
Hispanic peripheral voters analyzed in this study hypothesizes group
empowerment actuates when viable Hispanics seek office, thus surging
turnout.  
The data analyses from the three diverse case studies examined in this
paper, strongly support Hispanic surge-and-decline theory: when viable
Hispanic candidates seek office, Hispanic turnout increases significantly
relative to both Anglo turnout and baseline Hispanic turnout, and when no
viable Hispanic runs for office, Hispanic turnout decreases relatively.  As with
Angus Campbell’s theory of surge-and-decline, peripheral voters turnout less
often when they are dissatisfied with the candidate choices offered, and they
are activated to vote at higher rates when they like the choices presented to
them.  The surge effects are amplified by high-stimulus elections that have
high profile candidates or by precedent-setting elections.  The combined
effects of mobilization by Latino groups and self-activation vis-a-vis group
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consciousness create the overall effect of surge-and-decline on Hispanic
peripheral voters.  
Of the 18 San Antonio mayoral and the five Colorado senatorial
elections studied in the time series analyses, all but two conform to the
hypothesized surge-and-decline outcomes.  The first is the San Antonio  
1983-1985 sequence, which is unusual because no viable Anglo candidate ran
in 1983 and the second one is the Colorado 1996-1998 sequence which is not
statistically significant either way.  More important, when the projected San
Antonio and Colorado elections are aggregated and averaged by type, all the
averages for the projected surge, decline and desensitizing elections conform
perfectly to the theory of surge-and-decline.  A meaningful time series analysis
is not possible for New Mexico since New Mexico has several counties with
very high percent Native-American population, which makes it impracticable
to isolate Hispanic and Anglo turnouts.
In addition to the time series analyses, multiple regression analyses are
also conducted for the three case studies of the San Antonio mayoral elections,
the New Mexico gubernatorial elections and the Colorado senatorial elections. 
The results from the multiple regression analyses for all three case studies
strongly support the theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline effects on peripheral
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Hispanic voters.  The standardized coefficients for the change in the viable
Hispanic candidate status variable in the models are .655, .823 and .738 for
San Antonio, New Mexico and Colorado respectively and are all significant at
the 99.9 percent confidence level.  What is striking in all three case studies is
the fact that the viable Hispanic factor is more robust than the other variables
studied including incumbency and overlapping presidential elections. 
The fact that these case studies represent three different states, at three
different levels of data, in three different jurisdictions, in electorates that
include low, medium and high concentrations of Hispanic populations, and in
elections with and without overlapping presidential elections posits for wide
generaliziblity of the Hispanic surge-and-decline theory.  
Peripheral Hispanic voters are activated through surge-and-decline
effects, in part by mobilization and in part by self-activation vis-a-vis group
consciousness.  The surge-and-decline model incorporates activation from
mobilization effects and self-activation through group consciousness effects. 
This amalgamated theory represents the interaction between uniquely Hispanic
mobilization by Hispanic groups, and group consciousness and empowerment
that is actuated when viable candidates run for office.
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Implications of the Surge-and-Decline Model
Throughout much of the last 40 years, the Democratic party’s take-
Hispanics-for-granted approach combined with the Republican party’s neglect
approach has often lead to overall neglect and lack of mobilization within the
Hispanic community.  Exacerbating the broad lack of engagement by both
major parties has been a historical lack of viable Hispanic candidates who run
for office.  
On one side, the Democratic take-for-granted approach has left an
opening for the Republicans to make gains with the Hispanic voting populace. 
On the other side, the Republicans’ shallow skimming of Hispanic voters via
macro-electronics, which may be a cost efficient way to pickup votes in the
short term, will likely prove to be too thin to be sustainable over the long term. 
If the Democrats want to close the door on the Republicans, they must not take
the Hispanic voting population for granted.  Conversely, if the Republicans
want to expand their initial gains, they must become more substantive and
relevant in terms of policy.  Ultimately, just being open and inviting to the
Hispanic community is not enough to win substantial and sustaining
percentages of the Hispanic voter.
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Both parties need to conduct active grassroots mobilization efforts in
addition to macro-electronic advertising if they want to be truly successful. 
For the Democrats, this means conducting comprehensive, multi-faceted
outreach campaigns like the Kennedy and Clinton campaigns did during their
elections.  For the Republicans, this means adding real grassroots efforts that
go beyond the last minute media blitzes attempting to skim votes.  The recent
successes of Republicans George Bush, John McCain and Michael Bloomberg
illustrate the fact Hispanic voters are not as loyal to the Democratic party as
they once were, and Republicans can make significant inroads into the
Hispanic community with properly executed campaigns.  Conversely, the
blowback caused by the California propositions and comments from
candidates such as Pete Wilson have severely damaged the Republican
chances to make significant gains in some jurisdictions like California.  In the
short term, style is what opens the communication channels, however, over the
long haul, substance is what really matters.  
In many ways, the neglect by the Democrats and the schizophrenia of
the Republicans has created a situation where a significant proportion of the
potential voting Hispanic populace is agnostically in the middle, loyal to
neither party and mobilized by none.  Normatively, it will benefit the Hispanic
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community if both Democrats and Republicans actively try to engage,
persuade, mobilize and compete for potential Hispanic voters. 
The potency of the theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline on peripheral
Hispanic votes is observed when theoretically projecting out the possible
increase in turnout caused by having a viable Hispanic candidate run for either
President or Vice President in 2008.
Recent trends indicate the total Hispanic vote is increasing and is
trending toward the Republicans.  Even though the estimates vary, it is the
conventional wisdom that approximately 6 million Hispanics voted in 2000
and at least 7.5 million voted in 2004, a net increase of at least 25 percent
(WCVI/SVREP 2004; NCLR 2004; NEP 2004).  In 2000, the Voter News
Service, the Los Angeles Times and the New York Times reported that
Hispanics voted 35 percent, 38 percent and 31 percent respectively for an
average about 35 percent for the Republican Presidential candidate Bush. 
Then in 2004 the National Election Poll, the Los Angeles Times and the    
New York Times reported Hispanics voted 44 percent, 45 percent and 43
percent respectively for an average about 44 percent for the Republican
Presidential candidate Bush, thus representing a nine percentage point gain in
support by the Republicans.  Using these estimates, the Republican
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presidential ticket in 2004 received about 3.3 million votes from Hispanics
while the Democratic ticket received about 4.2 million votes from Hispanics,
for a differential of 900,000 votes favoring the Democrats [see Figures 8    
and 9].
Projecting out to the 2008 presidential election, using a current trends
model with the Republican candidate receiving about 44 percent of the
Hispanic vote with a Hispanic turnout of at least 9.5 million voters, the
Republicans would receive about 4.2 million Hispanic votes while Democrats
would receive about 5.3 million Hispanic votes, for a differential of 1.1
million votes favoring the Democrats [see Figures 8 and 9].
Projecting out to 2008 election using a Hispanic surge-and-decline
model with a viable Hispanic on the national Democratic ticket for President
or Vice President, turnout could go up an additional 20 percent to around 
11.3 million due to activation of peripheral voters.  It is possible the
Democratic slate would receive 70 percent or more of the Hispanic vote,
which would be slightly better than Clinton averaged in his two races.  Using
these potentially conservative assumptions, Republicans would receive about
3.4 million Hispanic votes while Democrats would receive about 7.9 million
Hispanic votes, for a sizeable and significant differential of 4.5 million votes 
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favoring the Democrats.  This would give the Democrats an additional 3.4
million Hispanic votes above the current trends model [see Figures 8 and 9]. 
Conversely, projecting out to 2008 election using a Hispanic surge-
and-decline model with a viable Hispanic on the national Republican ticket
for President or Vice President, turnout could go up an additional 15 percent
to around 10.8 million due to activation of peripheral voters.  With this
scenario it is possible the Republican slate could receive upwards to             
60 percent of the Hispanic vote, which would follow the current trend with an
amplification for surge-and-decline effects.  The potential for the Republicans
to receive upwards to 60 percent of the Hispanic vote is bolstered by such
polls as the Washington Post-Kaiser-Harvard poll that found 68 percent of
Latino voters describe themselves as either conservative or moderate (Booth
2000).  Using these assumptions, Republicans would receive about 6.5 million
Hispanic votes while Democrats would receive about 4.3 million Hispanic
votes, for a sizeable and very significant differential of 2.2 million votes
favoring the Republicans.  Thus creating a positive swing toward the
Republicans of 3.3 million Hispanic votes compared to the current trends
model [see Figures 8 and 9].
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Simply put, the Hispanic voting community is up for grabs.  Based on
the theory of Hispanic surge-and-decline effects on Hispanic peripheral voters,
this researcher posits that the first party to select a viable Hispanic vice
presidential candidate, and ultimately a viable presidential candidate, will be
the party that wins in the short term, and will be the party that realigns the
majority of Hispanic voters in the long term, for at least three to four decades.  
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Notes
1.  The Hispanic community is so diverse that descriptive terminology
is often inadequate and sometimes controversial within the broader Hispanic
community.  In a Newsweek poll conducted June 25-30, 1999 by Princeton
Survey Research Associates, Newsweek found that most Hispanic Americans
prefer to be called “Hispanics” rather than “Latinos.”  Of the 505 Hispanic
adults surveyed nationwide, 55 percent preferred the term Hispanic, 22
percent preferred the term Latino and 21 percent preferred both terms equally
or had no preference (Newsweek 1999).  Among the different major media
outlets, there is generally no accepted “stylization” for which term journalists
should use.  For example, the Wall Street Journal generally uses “Hispanic”
whereas the Los Angeles Times often uses “Latino.”  The United States
Census Bureau officially uses “Hispanic.”  For the purposes of this study, the
terms Hispanic(s) and Latino(s) are used interchangeably.
2.  America Journal of International Law, American Political Science
Review, International Organization, Journal of Politics, Midwest Journal of
Political Science, Political Science Quarterly, Public Opinion Quarterly,
World Politics, American Journal Political Science and Proceedings of the
American Political Science Association.  
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3.  The number of precincts per year studied fluctuated around 145. 
The geographic area is the same for each election of the study and always
maintained the 80 percent or more relative ethnic concentration.  Doing this
allowed the study to control for many extraneous geographic and regional
variables.  The 80 percent or more threshold is maintained for each group, for
all the elections studied.  Additionally, it should be noted inward migration
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Figure 2
Average of Projected Hispanic Surge, Decline and Desensitizing Elections
San Antonio Case Study
Hispanic Percent Turnout Change vs. Anglo Percent Turnout Change
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Figure 3
Projected Hispanic Surge Elections
San Antonio Case Study
Hispanic Percent Turnout Change vs. Anglo Percent Turnout Change
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Figure 4
Projected Hispanic Decline Elections
San Antonio Case Study
Hispanic Percent Turnout Change vs. Anglo Percent Turnout Change
141
Figure 5
Projected Hispanic Desensitizing Elections
San Antonio Case Study
Hispanic Percent Turnout Change vs. Anglo Percent Turnout Change
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Figure 6
Projected Hispanic Surge-and-Decline Elections
Colorado Case Study
Hispanic Percent Turnout Change vs. Anglo Percent Turnout Change
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Figure 7
Average of Projected Hispanic Surge-and-Decline Elections
Colorado Case Study 
Hispanic Percent Turnout Change vs. Anglo Percent Turnout Change
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Figure 8
Presidential Election Model Projections
Hispanic Votes by Party
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Figure 9
Presidential Election Model Projections





Voter Turnout for the 1977 through 2001 San Antonio Mayoral Elections
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Table 2
Standardized Coefficients from Multiple Regression Equations of
San Antonio Mayoral Elections 1991-2001
Model (A) (B) (C) (D) 
R .487 .557 .570 .5752 * * * *
Change in Viable Hispanic Mayoral Candidate (Dummy) .698 .657 .654 .655
Interaction Variable: Hispanic Dummy x Incumbency Dummy .268 .472 .484
Change in Mayoral Incumbency (Dummy) -.232 -.241
Percent registered Hispanic .068
  All variables are significant at the 99.9% level or higher.*
n = 1480 precincts
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Table 3
Standardized Coefficients from Multiple Regression Equations of
New Mexico Gubernatorial Elections 1990-2002
Model (A) (B) 
R .674 .7382 * *
Change in Viable Hispanic Gubernatorial Candidate (Dummy) .821 .823
Interaction Variable: Viable Hispanic x Incumbency x County Hispanic Percent .254
  All variables are significant at the 99.9% level or higher.*
n = 59 counties.
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Table 4
Standardized Coefficients from Multiple Regression Equations of
Colorado Senatorial Elections 1992-2004
Model (A) (B) 
R .776 .8142 * *
Change in Viable Hispanic Senatorial Candidate (Dummy) .881 .738
Interaction Variable: Incumbency Dummy x Presidential Election Dummy -.243
  All variables are significant at the 99.9% level or higher.*
n = 163 counties.
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